Pre-Electoral Coalitions in the Shadow of Hyperpresidentialism and Polarization: Turkey’s Opposition Parties’ Experience

In electoral authoritarian regimes, opposition parties must develop strategies to challenge the incumbent in the ballot box. A common strategy is to form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) since it seems a viable option to overthrow an authoritarian regime through elections, but when PECs are not carefully designed, coalition dynamics can become a valuable tool for the authoritarian government to control opposition elements, especially in affectively polarized environments. Turkey has recently emerged as a very suitable case for understanding this dilemma. Although the transition to a hyperpresidential system in 2017 and subsequent electoral rule changes are often cited as turning points, earlier institutional shifts during the 2007 presidential crisis and the de facto semi-presidential system in 2010 laid the groundwork for opposition to face significant strategic challenges. By analyzing three consecutive presidential electoral cycles in Turkey (2014, 2018, 2023) in which opposition parties have repeatedly come together in various forms but failed to counter the authoritarian regime effectively, this study identifies the critical junctures experienced by process tracing. It reveals that the whole process, including the recent experience of the Nation Alliance established by six main opposition actors in Turkey, whose main character is anti-Erdoganism, diverged from the central premises of coalition theories emphasizing size, proportionality, and ideological proximity. Instead, opposition parties with different ideological backgrounds and sizes came with an overarching theme of bringing democracy back. However, due to the priority of presidential elections, those coalitions are also leader-centered, and the negotiation processes are generally carried out behind closed doors. Moreover, the varying electoral strength and ideological backgrounds of coalition members who sit on the negotiation table as equals, with no established hierarchy, put an additional strain on the adopted consociational decision-making. As a result, this structure paradoxically led to internal inefficiencies and deadlocks among the partners in reaching timely decisions, particularly on critical issues such as selecting a presidential candidate, deciding on the names in the joint candidate lists, and producing a campaign that included clear and understandable messages to the voters. Thus, the opposition’s anti-polarization discourse, which establishes itself as a pro-democracy actor by transforming and reframing the primary cleavage into a democracy vs. authoritarianism divide, proved insufficient and vulnerable to the incumbent's polarizing populist rhetoric. In turn, it intensified existing divisions. The study aims to show the complex interaction between coalition formation, opposition strategies, and the enduring polarization in Turkey’s political landscape. By adopting a process-oriented approach toward the PECs and focusing on a case of failure, the study differs from the dominant outcome-oriented approach within the literature, which typically examines only the successful cases. The study offers broader implications for other contexts experiencing democratic backsliding and executive aggrandizement, and it aims to contribute to theorizing the internal processes, strategic decisions, and structural dynamics of PECs as a critical strategy in resisting autocratization and polarization.