Anti-Populist strategies to address the domestic opposition in foreign policy: the Biden Administration

Previous research indicates that anti-populist and populist politicians rely on very similar strategies to delegitimise their opponents. Specifically, foreign policy constitutes an equally profitable arena for populists and anti-populists to mobilise support against the domestic opposition. Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that anti-populists in office do not permanently mobilise the electorate around foreign policy issues. Sometimes, anti-populist executives may even pursue accommodative strategies and seek collaboration with populists. Considering these circumstances, this article aims to answer the following questions: What discursive strategies have anti-populist leaders to address populists in foreign policy speeches? And under what circumstances are anti-populists more likely to use foreign policy as a resource to mobilise support against populists in the opposition? I argue that anti-populists can rely on two discursive strategies to deal with the populists in the opposition in their foreign policy speeches: mobilisation, and accommodation. I suggest that compared to populists in office, anti-populists face less pressures to mobilise ‘the people’, and henceforth they mostly use foreign policy as a strategy for self-legitimation during electoral campaigns. Empirically, this article draws form the Joe Biden administration, which was largely considered anti-populist, and explores how Joe Biden referred to the Republican Party in foreign policy speeches delivered to domestic audiences. The analysis focuses mostly on the speeches addressing the Ukrainian war and the Israel-Palestine war. By shedding light on the different kind of foreign policy strategies that anti-populists pursue vis-à-vis populists in the opposition, future research can trace or even predict patterns of cooperation between anti-populists and populists in foreign policy.