The Grey Side of Proportional Representation

Proportional representation appears a very simple concept. It also has some very strong normative properties. It is in a sense uniquely democratic. If if we start from the principle of "one person, one vote, one value", then this logically implies the principle of proportionality. However, when we consider the details of how proportional representation is implemented (for example, indivisible seats, demands for local representation, the need to select candidates in a democratically defensible manner) things become more complicated. This is not to subtract from the normative appeal of proportionality. Rather it is to note trade-off that may be unavoidable. One criticism made of proportional representation as usually implemented is that it does not give voters full control over which candidates are elected. Voters are only given one vote, and sometimes (though uncommonly) this has to be for a party. We can ask whether we can extend the principle of proportionality to electoral systems where voters can rank all candidates. The answer is only with considerable difficulty. The minority protection characteristic of proportional representation directly come from the fact that voters only get one choice. If you give voters multiple votes you lose a great deal of minority protection, unless you implement a system that forces the multiple choices to be discounted to act like a single vote (single transferable vote being the most famous example). This leads to voting paradoxes and arbitrary, quasi-chaotic behaviour. Closed list PR is sometimes taken as the paradigmatic form of PR (particularly by its critics). However, this is rather rare. Systems where candidates get to indicate preference for a candidate are far more common. This makes the analysis (both normative and positive) considerably more complicated. Open-list PR system may encourage intraparty conflict, factionalism and even corruption. Furthermore, it is not clear they are really proportional in terms of the selection of candidates (as opposed to allocation to parties). Semi-open list systems appear to behave a lot like closed list systems. However, this appears to be because voters usually do not make full use of them. If more voters used their ability to promote candidates in low ranked position, many systems would behave essentially like open-list systems, with all the attendant problems. PR system with low and medium levels of district magnitude are also common. Apart from not being completely proportional (or as proportional as assembly size allows), this introduces a number of other dynamics. With low district magnitude, it is possible for the relative size of parties to be large bleached, as each party in a district wins only one seat, (especially if the number of parties is high due to societal pluralism, as in Indonesia). The dynamics by which party seats share get translated into bargaining power also becomes more complex.