For several research fields, large-scale research infrastructures play a crucial role in advancing cutting-edge research, with the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) often being referred to as a particularly successful example. Accounts of how “big science” projects like CERN get off the ground abound in the history of science as well as in popular science. Typically, individual scientists are seen to be pivotal in initiating large-scale research infrastructures (just think of the role of Isidor I. Rabi in the early phase of CERN). However, the specific strategies and tactics that scientists use to put a large-scale research infrastructure on the agenda of policymakers are rarely examined through a theoretical lens, impeding a more systematic understanding of what strategies and tactics may or may not work in advocating for big science. In my recently published article, I address this issue by drawing on the interest group and agenda-setting scholarship to study the strategies and tactics that the Confederation of Laboratories for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research in Europe (CAIRNE) has used to advocate for the so-called CERN for AI. In this blog post, I reflect on which strategies and tactics have proven successful and which have not.[i]

What is CERN for AI?

There are multiple, and in part clashing, visions of CERN for AI (this blog post provides a detailed overview). I will focus on the vision of CAIRNE, possibly one of the fiercest advocates for a CERN for AI. CAIRNE promotes a CERN for AI that: 

• Consists of a central hub, supported by a network of (CAIRNE) research clusters;
• Is used to conduct research on all aspects of AI;
• Has close links to industry;
• Develops AI that aligns with European norms and values; and
• Is publicly funded. 

CAIRNE started to advocate for CERN for AI in 2017, based on two central arguments. First, the organization considers it vital to bring Europe’s top AI researchers together in a central place to coordinate their research efforts and to agree on a few top research priorities for the field. According to CAIRNE, this is needed to help the European AI community overcome its fragmentation. Second, CAIRNE argues that more hardware is needed to enable cutting-edge AI research in Europe and to catch up with AI frontrunners like the US and China. When CAIRNE was founded in 2018, CERN for AI became one of the central issues that the organization advocated for. However, despite CAIRNE’s continuous advocacy, CERN for AI has not (yet) materialized. This may soon change, as the initiative has made it to the highest political level: Ursula von der Leyen recently proposed to set up a “European AI Research Council where we can pool all of our resources, similar to the approach taken with CERN.”

Invest in a variety of strategies

Between 2017 and 2025, CAIRNE used different means to draw policymakers’ and the broader public’s attention to CERN for AI, three of which proved particularly useful. First, CAIRNE engaged with different members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to convince them of CERN for AI’s merit. This parliamentary strategy has paid off, as several MEPs have begun to back CERN for AI during the deliberations for the AI Act. Second, CAIRNE’s founding members invested a great deal of time and effort into promoting CERN for AI by writing countless opinion pieces and giving interviews for prominent media outlets across the EU. For example, their proposal featured in “der Tagesspiegel,” and “Science Business.” This media strategy drew attention to CERN for AI beyond a specialist audience. Finally, and in line with a mobilization strategy, CAIRNE drew attention to CERN for AI among the AI community, think tanks and the broader public by organizing CERN for AI-dedicated events and publishing open letters. Across all these strategies, CAIRNE credibly presented CERN for AI as an issue that needs to be addressed at the EU-level: Firstly, because the funding needed for CERN for AI would likely exceed the capacities of any one EU Member State and, secondly, because the entire European AI research community should benefit from and participate in CERN for AI. 

Find the right label

A CAIRNE strategy that created controversy, especially within the European AI community, was the framing of the proposed AI research infrastructure as a CERN for AI. Several people that I interviewed for my article argued that, in principle, it is beneficial to use the renowned CERN “brand” to promote a large-scale, European (AI) research infrastructure. Yet, in the case of the CERN for AI initiative, this strategy backfired. There are two reasons for this. First, at about the same time as CAIRNE started to promote CERN for AI, a group of prominent AI researchers that is now known as “ELLIS” advocated for a networked AI research infrastructure modeled on the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL). Given the EU’s limited funding for AI and the enormous price tag of any AI research infrastructure, ELLIS had no interest in supporting CAIRNE’s proposal. Second, critics of CERN for AI, among them ELLIS members, argued that the CERN label did not make sense in the context of AI because, unlike to the massive colliders at CERN, the computing power necessary for AI research does not need to be centralized. (Somewhat ironically, while criticizing CAIRNE’s framing, ELLIS failed to acknowledge that back in the day, the EMBL was promoted as a Conseil Européen de la Recherche Biologique). Critics of CERN for AI have further argued that using the CERN label for a large-scale AI research infrastructure is “misleading” because the current political circumstances are not comparable to those that eventually facilitated the establishment of CERN. 

Balance centralization with decentralizatio

In the future, scientists and scientific organizations like CAIRNE may therefore want to frame their proposals for large-scale science infrastructures more strategically. Historical research has shown that promoting a “big science” project as a CERN of [insert relevant scientific discipline] does not necessarily have to backfire. What seems to play an important role is that those advocating for a large-scale science project in a research field that does not strictly require big instruments choose a framing that manages to balance the best of both worlds: the unifying moment of centralization and the efficiency of decentralization. Such a framing is also likely to more strongly appeal to policymakers and thus find political backing because a central research facility supported by a network of research clusters would maximize the number of constituencies that see a return on investment from big science.  

Dr. Anna-Lena Rüland is a research fellow with the European Research Council-funded project “Addressing Global Challenges through International Scientific Consortia” at the University College London Global Business School for Health. She graduated with a PhD in science policy from Leiden University in July 2024 and currently conducts research on science diplomacy, research security, as well as science, technology and innovation policy. 

This blog post is based on her article that won the 2024 Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar from the ECPR Standing Group ‘Knowledge Politics and Policies’. This was the eighth time this prize was awarded. Previous winners are Cecilia Ivardi and Linda Wanklin, Anke Reinhardt, Adrienn Nyircsák, Alexander Mitterle, Justyna Bandola-Gill, Emma Sabzalieva, Olivier Provini and Que Anh Dang.

This blog post was first published on Europe of Knowledge blog.

References

Cassata, Francesco. 2024. A ‘Heavy Hammer to Crack a Small Nut'? The Creation of the European Molecular Biology Conference (EMBC), 1963–1970. Annals of Science: 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/00033790.2024.2351511.

Hoos, Holger. 2023. ‘AI made in Europe’ am Wendepunkt. Der Tagesspiegel, 7 July 2023.

Kelly, Éanna. 2021. Call for a ‘CERN for AI’ as Parliament Hears Warnings on Risk of Killing the Sector with Over-Regulation. Science Business, 25 March 2021.

Kohler, Kevin. 2024. CERN for AI: An Overview. https://machinocene.substack.com/p/cern-for-ai-an-overview.Accessed 13 February 2025.

Matthews, David. 2024. Call for the EU to Build Publicly Funded Cutting-Edge Artificial Intelligence. Science Business, 4 January 2024.

Rüland, Anna-Lena. 2025. “We Need a CERN for AI”: Organized Scientific Interests and Agenda-Setting in European Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy. Minerva Online first. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-024-09568-6

Wulff Wold, Jacob. 2024. Von der Leyen Gives Nod to €100 Billion CERN for AI Proposal. Euroactiv, 25 July 2024.

In the ever-evolving landscape of European higher education, the European Universities Initiative (EUI) stands out as a flagship project that emerged with surprising speed and ambition. But how does such a major initiative take shape in an area where the European Union (EU) has only limited formal competence and an area characterised by significant institutional autonomy?

In our article published recently in the Journal of European Integration, we utilize the strategic resource exchange perspective (Bouwen, 2004) and focus on the role of stakeholder organizations – including associations of universities – in developing the EUI, an initiative aimed at fostering deeper integration through transnational alliances of universities (Cino Pagliarello, 2022). We unpack the development of the EUI from a passing reference in a 2017 speech by French President Emmanuel Macron to the launch of the first call for proposals just a year later. Drawing on interviews, document analysis, and data from the EU Transparency Register, we trace how the European Commission navigated the constraints of limited legal authority by leveraging the legitimacy and expertise of some of the stakeholder organizations.

The Commission’s Strategic Selection of Stakeholders in Limited Competence Areas

Higher education is a classic example of a policy domain where EU member states retain primary control. The EU’s role is largely supportive, with no power to harmonize national systems through hard law. This makes the rapid development of the EUI rather intriguing, especially given the overall crisis of European integration, including in higher education (Corbett & Hantrais, 2023). In such a partially institutionalized decision-making arena, the rules of the game are not entirely settled. The question then becomes who does the Commission decide to invite to the table, given that it does not have to utilize a particular approach to stakeholder consultations (Binderkrantz et al., 2021).

Our point of departure is the well-established resource exchange perspective on the relationship between EU institutions and stakeholder organizations (Nørgaard et al., 2014). The Commission, which in this case is lacking (important) policy resources – legal authority and technical knowledge – will strategically give access to those stakeholder organizations that can supply these policy resources.

The core finding of the study is the active role of the European Commission in selecting which stakeholder organizations to involve in the policy process. Rather than opening the floor to all interested parties, the Commission curated two groups of actors that could provide the specific types of legitimacy and knowledge it needed to move the initiative forward: an ad-hoc stakeholder group and ad-hoc expert group. While the latter included Member State representatives (whose inclusion is important for legitimacy, given the limited EU competences in this area), the former included well-established European university associations and networks that had a track record of engaging with EU institutions. Their involvement lent credibility to the initiative and helped align it with the interests of national higher education systems. At the same time, the Commission involved actors in the ad-hoc stakeholder group that had gathered experience in similar cooperation outlets such as the ones envisioned by the EUI, e.g. border region networks. This selective engagement reflects a broader pattern in EU governance, where the Commission uses stakeholder consultations not just to gather input, but to shape the policy environment in ways that support its strategic goals.

Legitimacy, Knowledge, and Access

The case of the EUI illustrates how the EU can innovate and expand its influence even in areas where its formal powers are weak. By strategically engaging with stakeholder organizations, the Commission can build coalitions, generate momentum, and legitimize its actions. We identified distinct forms of legitimacy and knowledge as key resources that stakeholder organizations brought to the table. In addition to the classic representational legitimacy (speaking for a broad constituency), also procedural legitimacy (being part of established consultation mechanisms) and normative legitimacy (aligning with EU values and goals) were important. Knowledge included both technical expertise and practical insights into how higher education systems operate on the ground. In exchange for these resources, stakeholders gained access to decision-makers and the opportunity to shape a high-profile initiative. This mutual benefit helped to overcome the institutional limitations of EU in the education policy domain and enabled the Commission to act as a policy entrepreneur.

Conclusion and Implications for EU Policy-Making

The European Universities Initiative may be a flagship project, but its development was anything but straightforward. As we show, it was the product of careful orchestration, strategic alliances, and the subtle exercise of power through resource exchange. Our study reminds us that even in areas of limited competence, the EU is far from powerless—and that understanding how it acts requires looking beyond formal rules to the networks and negotiations that drive policy forward. Our analysis confirms that resource exchange is a valuable lens for understanding the dynamics of EU policy-making in constrained environments. It also highlights the importance of studying the micro-politics of consultation and engagement, which often shape the outcomes of major initiatives behind the scenes. However, this approach also raises important questions about transparency and inclusiveness. If only certain stakeholders are invited to the table, whose voices are left out? And how can the EU ensure that its consultation processes remain open and democratic, rather than becoming tools for technocratic steering?

Bibliography:

Binderkrantz, A. S., Blom-Hansen, J., & Senninger, R. (2021). Countering bias? The EU Commission’s consultation with interest groups. Journal of European Public Policy, 28(4), 469-488. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1748095

Bouwen, P. (2004). Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions. European Journal of Political Research, 43(3), 337-369. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00157.x

Cino Pagliarello, M. (2022). Higher education in the single market between (trans)national integration and supranationalisation: exploring the european universities initiative. Journal of European Integration, 44(1), 149-164. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.2011266

Corbett, A., & Hantrais, L. (2023). Higher education and research in the Brexit policy process. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2181854

Nørgaard, R. W., Nedergaard, P., & Blom-Hansen, J. (2014). Lobbying in the EU Comitology System. Journal of European Integration,36(5), 491-507. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.889128

From the Standing Group on Knowledge Politics and Policies

It is our great pleasure to announce that the jury comprising Tatiana Fumasoli (University College London, UK), Emanuela Reale (IRCRES NRC, Italy), and Kieron Flanagan (University of Manchester, UK) has decided to award the 2024 Excellent Paper Award by the ECPR Standing Group on Knowledge Politics and Policies to Anna-Lena Rülandfrom the University College London (UK) for her paper titled 'We need a CERN for AI': Organized scientific interests and agenda-setting in European science, technology, and innovation policy.

In the view of the jury, the paper presents an in-depth case study of the CERN for AI initiative to shed light on the role of organized scientific interests in European STI agenda-setting. The manuscript is very informative on the lobbying strategies and process of interactions in the case analyzed. The analytical framework is constructed well and the methodological approach and analysis of whether and how prominent ideas make it onto the formal political agenda.

The paper has been recently published in Minerva, and you can read it open access here [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11024-024-09568-6].

Anna-Lena Rüland is a research fellow with the European Research Council-funded project “Addressing Global Challenges through International Scientific Consortia” at the University College London Global Business School for Health. She graduated with a PhD in science policy from Leiden University (Netherlands) in July 2024 and currently conducts research on science diplomacy, research security, as well as science, technology and innovation policy.