Global university rankings have got prominence in recent decades. Nation-states develop evaluation policies drawing on the assessment criteria of world rankings aiming their universities to take higher positions in these rankings (Salmi & Saroyan, 2007). QS Rankings is one of them. It is a profitable business that generated €46 m in revenue in 2019 (Shahjahan et al., 2022). Research assessment by QS Rankings takes the form of citations (excluding self-citations) per faculty indicator (Staff, 2021). 

Since the 2010s Ukrainian media and the education ministry have traced the positions of Ukrainian universities in QS Rankings (Higher Education, 2011). However, since 2022, everyday survival has taken priority over research in the lives of Ukrainian scholars. The paradox of war is that, while life-threatening conditions, shelling, blackouts and economic recession are the part of everyday reality, work obligations and responsibilities remain the same as they were in pre-war life. This applies to all, including scholars. Despite the war, Ukrainian scholars continue to publish which deserves respect. As well, Ukrainian universities participate in QS Rankings 2025.

However, QS is a for-profit company the aim of which is not to contribute to societal well-being but to increase its profits. Elsevier which provides data for QS is another for-profit company the aim of which is also to increase revenue. The same concerns publishers issuing Gold Open Access journals, as many of them are oriented on publishing as many articles as possible to ensure profits. 

The university is a key institution for social and economic development in a knowledge-intensive society (Mohrman et al., 2008). University performance is supposed to result in the quality of life, technological progress and social well-being of the nation. These are the ends that the university is supposed to achieve through research. Publications are just one of the means of achieving of these ends. QS Rankings has turned the means of universities into their ends. The university’s position in the global ranking reflects, first, the economic development of the country. Second, the university position at the national level. A university cannot increase its position in the ranking, if there is no economic growth and beneficial conditions for science in the country. On the other hand, the university should contribute to economic growth at the national level. 

The examination of the assessment of six Ukrainian universities in QS Rankings 2025, first, raise concerns regarding the mismatch between the faculty staff of universities announced on the QS Rankings website and the number of authors affiliated with the explored institutions in their research outputs. Second, it is unclear why the articles in the journals discontinued from Scopus are still in Scopus and correspondingly they are not excluded from the research output assessed by QS Rankings. Third, QS Rankings uses closed data. University managers do not have access to these data and cannot use them while developing research assessment policies. While developing the research assessment policies, universities mostly use SciVal provided by Scopus for a fee. However, there is a mismatch in data that shows SciVal and data that uses QS Rankings. First, QS Rankings normalises only by disciplines but SciVal normalises by year, discipline and document type. As conference papers are less cited than articles, normalisation by a document type results in a high FWCI shown by SciVal. Second, QS Rankings excludes self-citations but SciVal provides data including self-citations.      

The IRN (International Research Network) index introduced by QS Rankings requires universities to increase the number of countries they collaborate with. It means that not academics but QS Rankings decides with whom they need to collaborate. Aiming to increase the IRN index, Sumy State University gives points if the article increases the number of collaborating countries. This is nothing else but means-ends decoupling.

The study findings resonate with the other studies that raise concerns about the ability of QS Rankings as well as other rankings to be a trustworthy assessment tool (Chirikov, 2023; Teixeira da Silva, 2024; Shahjahan, et al., 2021). In 2024, the University Zurich has withdrawn from the ranking published by Times Higher Education magazine. University announced that rankings create false incentives focusing on measurable output, forcing universities to increase the number of publications rather than prioritise the quality of content (Swissinfo, 2024). In 2023, Korean universities boycotted QS Rankings because of the IRN index (Jung & Sharma, 2023). 

Six Ukrainian universities participating in QS Rankings 2025 have publications in discontinued from Scopus and MDPI journals. MDPI journals is a fast and easy way of publishing for a fee. The question is why academics from a country at war with underfunding science and low salaries are ready to pay an unaffordable APC (article processing fee). Arguably there is a high degree of international collaboration in articles in MDPI journals because Ukrainian academics are interested in finding a foreign co-author able to pay an APC. However, the question is who benefits from publications with a high APC except for publishers that make revenue? Academics publish at the cost of science because the money spent on APCs could be invested in science.

The findings highlight that articles (co)-authored by Ukrainian academics co-affiliated with foreign institutions or foreign academics have a higher impact than articles authored by only Ukrainian researchers. The share of articles authored by only Ukrainian authors ranges from 52.6% to 73.3%. Thus, Ukrainian academics have the space to strengthen collaboration with foreign colleagues.

To summarise, the research assessment criteria at the global, national and university levels must be oriented towards scientific excellence that results in economic growth and societal well-being. Ukrainian case shows that means-ends decoupling at the global, national and organisational levels results in diversion of critical resources, both financial and human. This negatively impacts on the development of society, the economy and the fulfilment of the talents of individuals in academia as well.

Myroslava Hladchenko is researcher in Kyiv, Ukraine. Her research focuses on higher education, universities and research assessment. This blog post is based on her recent article Hladchenko, M. (2025) Ukrainian universities in QS World University Rankings: when the means become ends. Scientometrics 130, 969–997. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-024-05165-2  

Acknowledgements

This project has received funding through the MSCA4Ukraine project, which is funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the MSCA4Ukraine Consortium as a whole nor any individual member institutions of the MSCA4Ukraine Consortium can be held responsible for them.

References

Chirikov, I. (2023). Does conflict of interest distort global university rankings?. Higher education, 86(4), 791-808.

Higher Education (2011). Ukrainian universities at first in the global rankings http://vnz.org.ua/statti/879-ukrayinski-vnz-upershe-v-mizhnarodnomu-rejtyngu-zadovoleni-ne-vsi

Jung, U., and Sharma, Y. (2023) Korean universities unite against QS ranking changes https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20230704195008557

Mohrman, K., Ma, W., & Baker, D. (2008). The research university in transition: The emerging global model. Higher Education Policy, 21(1), 5–27

Salmi, J., & Saroyan, A. (2007). League tables as policy instruments: Uses and misuses. Higher education management and policy, 19(2), 1-38.

Shahjahan, R. A., Grimm, A., & Allen, R. M. (2021). The “LOOMING DISASTER” for higher education: How commercial rankers use social media to amplify and foster affect. Higher Education, 1-17.

Shahjahan, R. A., Sonneveldt, E. L., Estera, A. L., & Bae, S. (2022). Emoscapes and commercial university rankers: the role of affect in global higher education policy. Critical Studies in Education, 63(3), 275-290.

Staff, W. (2021). Understanding the methodology: QS World University Rankings https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings-articles/world-university-rankings/understanding-methodology-qs-world-university-rankings

Swissinfo (2024) University of Zurich withdraws from international university rankinghttps://education.am/abroad_en/tpost/48hm4eipi1-university-of-zurich-withdraws-from-inte

Teixeira da Silva, J. A. (2024). How are global university rankings adjusted for erroneous science, fraud and misconduct? Posterior reduction or adjustment in rankings in response to retractions and invalidation of scientific findings. Journal of Information Science, 01655515241269499.

This post was originally published on Europe of Knowledge blog.

The European Union's (EU) decision to exclude the military from the scope of its AI policy, as outlined in the AI Act, raises an important question: to what extent does this decision align with reality, particularly in the context of evolving defense-related programs and instruments, such as the European Defence Fund? This question builds on existing analyses, which reveal that dual-use technologies are already embedded in military-related practices within the EU but are still framed primarily as market-driven industrial policies rather than as security-focused initiatives. I argue that, given the dual-use nature of AI, the EU follows the same pattern to focus on the market and industry side of AI as civilian. Meanwhile the military side is being sidelined despite exercising military power in terms of AI. The main intrigue is – how the EU frames military AI within the related strategic discourse. 

I analyse this question in my new article ‘Transformation, insecurity, and uncontrolled automation: frames of military AI in the EU AI strategic discourse’ (Lingevicius, 2024) released in the Critical Military Studies journal. 

Frames of military AI

In the article, I identify three intertextual frames within the EU’s AI strategic discourse. These frames do not appear to be static or arranged in a hierarchical order. Instead, they reflect diverse positions and ongoing tensions within EU institutions. For instance, the European Parliament advocates for a more proactive approach to incorporating the military, whereas the European Commission maintains its stance of excluding the military from the policy scope.

The first frame suggests that military AI is perceived as transformative technology which requires the EU to adapt to this changing landscape. Transformation is closely attached to the international environment which is seen as competitive and challenging the EU to be competitive as well. Therefore, transformation is not solely about pursuing technological advancement but also about positioning the EU at the forefront, particularly in comparison to other major powers such as the United States and China. Lastly, this frame encompasses various calls for building military AI-enabled capacities, suggesting that transformation has also become synonymous with increased armament aimed at securing a competitive edge.

The second frame leans towards a different direction where in international dynamics there is about increased insecurity because of the arms race. In other words, it contains meanings which portray external developments related to military AI as threatening the EU. Again, international dynamics is interwoven with the perception of technology, which is considered as being unknown and uncontrolled while its developments and (mis)uses may raise concerns. Therefore, such a situation is unfavorable to the EU’s ambitions to be competitive because the race creates even more uncertainty. 

The third frame portrays military AI as uncontrolled automation, focusing less on the international environment and more on the nature of the technology itself. In this case, concerns are mainly articulated through anticipating reduced human involvement and challenged human agency mainly through autonomous weapons systems. Therefore, the international engagement receives different perspectives – to multilaterally engage and cooperate with other partners in order to ensure the ‘human in the loop’ principle. In this case, military AI is perceived as a source of insecurity, with the response rooted not in the pursuit of greater technological power but in normative principles aimed at mitigating the potential of automation.

Overall, these identified frames reveal different sources of insecurity leading to different EU responses (to build military capability, to navigate through the arms race, and/or to ensure control) internalizing the military as well.

The EU takes an in-between position

The frames also appear closely related to how the EU perceives and aims to define itself. Despite mentioned ambiguity of the EU to openly discuss military-related concerns, the empirical evidence suggests that the integration of military thinking into the AI framework is being actively pursued. Therefore, I argue that the EU’s position can be described as one of in-betweenness, as it navigates a state of liminality while transitioning across boundaries. Those boundaries are marked by different elements of the military power (embracing transformation and military capacity building), the normative power (establishing values-driven principles to control military AI uses) and market power (competition through production and ownership).

At the same time, the empirical evidence supports claims that the EU exploits the nature of AI as dual-use technology by putting the spotlight on one side (civil) but sidelining the other (military). Such reinforced duality enables the EU to keep room for manoeuvres and frame its self-image as it prefers, despite evolving military practices and noticeable contradictions. However, potentiality of dual-use technology to be civil and military also creates risks of manipulation, which involves challenging boundaries and accountability in the context where the expansion of the military power is dispersed across different policies. The case of the emerging EU AI policy demonstrates that the military then becomes implicated in civilian policies such as the single market, industry, R&D, and digitalization. Therefore, it remains important to challenge official positions to understand their implications and to foster critical debates that address existing inconsistencies.

Justinas Lingevicius is a Lecturer and PhD candidate at Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Lithuania.

References:

Justinas Lingevicius (2024): Transformation, insecurity, and uncontrolled automation: frames of military AI in the EU AI strategic discourse, Critical Military Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2024.2387890

This post was initially published on Europe of Knowledge blog. 

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