Contentious Politics in the Middle East - A Channel of Public Opinion or Regime Tool?

Abstract

The literature on social movement outcomes highlights the importance of medium levels of disruption, high levels of participation, and third-party elite support in order to have an impact on government policies (Piven and Cloward 1978; DeNardo 1985; Gurr 1986; Apodaca 2001; Davenport 1999; Davenport 1999; Davenport 1999; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Gartner and Regan 1996; Poe and Tate 1994; Franklin 2009). These studies suggest ways in which contentious politics serves as an expression of public opinion. On the other hand, we have in recent years seen examples of counter-revolutions directed "from above", that is, generated by political leaders or regimes themselves (Wedeen 1999; Al-Rasheed 2011; Filiu 2015; Heydeman and Leenders 2011). Dobry (2009, 1986: 16) argues that protests against the authorities, initiated from below, and mobilization organized by agents of social control, follow similar logics, with a competition to control them. « Recuperation » of popular protests by established elites and regime agents is one example of such competition over control. For instance, the Lebanese March 14 movement emerged out of spontaneous popular anger and secular civil society organizations, but was later seized by sectarian politicians who rerouted the movement from its course (Clark and Salloukh 2013: 740; Young 2010 : 39). Our panel compares various mechanisms and processes of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001 : 27) in the Middle East, addressing the function and effectiveness of different elite strategies. The papers use cases from different countries in the region, including Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Tunisia, focusing on the period following the Arab uprisings in 2011.