Knowing and the Known: The Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences

This course is a broad survey of epistemological, ontological, and methodological issues relevant to the production of knowledge in the social sciences. The course has three overlapping and interrelated objectives:

• to provide you with a grounding in these issues as they are conceptualised and debated by philosophers, social theorists, and intellectuals more generally;
• to act as an introduction to the ways in which these issues have been incorporated (sometimes—often—inaccurately) into different branches of the social sciences;
• to be a forum for reflection on the relationship between these issues and the concrete conduct of your own and others' research.

That said, this is neither a technical 'research design' nor a 'proposal writing' course, but is pitched as a somewhat greater level of abstraction. As we proceed, however, you should try not to lose sight of the fact that these philosophical debates have profound consequences for practical research. Treat this course as an opportunity to set aside some time to think critically, creatively, and expansively about the status of knowledge: that which you have produced and will produce, and that produced by others.

The 'science question' rests more heavily on the social sciences than it does on the natural sciences, for the simple reason that the evident successes of the natural sciences in enhancing the human ability to control and manipulate the physical world stands as a powerful rejoinder to any scepticism about the scientific status of fields of inquiry like physics and biology.

The social science have long laboured in the shadow of those successes, and one popular response has been to try to model the social sciences on one or another of the natural sciences; this naturalism forms one of the recurrent gestures in the philosophy of the social sciences, and we will trace it through its incarnation in the Logical Positivism of the Vienna Circle and then into the 'post-positivist' embrace of falsification as the mark of a scientific statement.

Problems generated by the firm emphasis on lawlike generalisations through both of these naturalistic approaches to social science lead to the reformulated naturalism of critical realism, as well as to the rejection of naturalism by pragmatists and followers of classical sociologists like Max Weber.

Finally, we will consider the tradition of critical theory stemming from the Frankfurt School, and the contemporary manifestation of that commitment to reflexive knowledge in feminist and post-colonial approaches to social science.

While not an exhaustive survey of the philosophy of the social sciences, this course will serve as an opportunity to explore some perennial issues of great relevance to the conduct of social-scientific inquiry, and will thus function as a solid foundation for subsequent reading and discussion—and for the practice of social science.

Throughout, we will draw on exemplary work from anthropology, economics, sociology and political science; you are encouraged to draw on your own discipline as well as these others to inform your reflections.

This course presumes no prior detailed familiarity with the philosophy of social science, beyond that gained by any practicing social scientist in the course of meeting the challenges associated with the conduct of her or his research project. The course does, however, presume a willingness to think of social science as a philosophical rather than just a technical endeavour.

A course in basic European philosophy during one’s university experience would be a plus, although the reading of a couple of good survey books like Richard Bernstein’s The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory or Ian Hacking’s The Social Construction of What? are advised as a refresher in any event.

The vocabulary introduced and developed in The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, second edition (Routledge, 2016) will inform the course lectures.