Clientelism and Policy Effects: Evidence from Russia 1996‒2008

This paper examines the political economy of clientelism in the Russian Federation. The paper explores the links between federal and sub-national transfers and patronage politics, and especially the role of non-monetised 'in-kind' payments and 'hidden' unemployment in the Russian agricultural sector. The paper outlines a model where politicised transfers between the regional authorities and enterprise managers are used for political ends. This model is tested with multilevel analysis of an original dataset of local 'rayon' (county) level electoral and socio-economic data (N=2067, nested in 75 regions) from the Russian Federation between 1996 and 2008. The paper finds strong evidence of electoral mobilisation in agricultural areas, even when controlling for the size and several structural and socio-economic characteristics of the rayons and the sub-national regional context. The paper also discusses the effects of the patronage linkages on the modernisation of Russian agriculture and on land reform policies.