To Elect or Appoint? The Impact of Election or Appointment of Local Officials on Public Goods Provision in Jordan

Does the holding of elections improve public goods provision? On the one hand, elections permit voters to hold leaders accountable and to punish those who have not provided public goods for the community. On the other hand, the desire to win elections may encourage politicians to provide a greater amount of “pork”, engage in more clientelistic behavior, and reward certain voters but not others. Ambitious office-holders may prefer to focus on providing clientelistic rather than public goods in order to gain and maintain popularity. These tendencies may be particularly strong in authoritarian regimes where elected officials have limited political power and regime leaders prefer officials to focus primarily on the clientelistic benefits of holding office. Through the analysis of local budget data on municipal-level public goods provision in Jordan, I will examine in this paper whether appointed or elected public officials are superior in providing public goods. From the period of 2001-2007, all mayors and half of all the members of all municipal council members were appointed. But from 2007 onwards, all mayors and all members of the council were elected. Using this natural experiment, I will compare the provision of public goods across all 93 of Jordan’s municipalities when leaders were appointed and when they were elected.