Deterrence and Trust: A Paradox at Low Numbers

Since the 1950’s, but especially with the refreshment and wide endorsement of the idea of nuclear abolition in recent years, practitioners and academics highlight trust-building measures between nuclear weapons states (NWS) as a vital instrument in the nuclear arms control toolbox – although with limited real-world effects. Surprisingly, an in-depth examination of the manifold aspects of the link between trust and trust-building and other, more widely pursued approaches to nuclear nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament like deterrence or arms reduction treaties is still pending. My paper and input at the ECPR panel “New and Old Governance in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation” aims to contribute to tackle this shortcoming. In particular, I will scrutinise the relationship between trust and nuclear deterrence in the context of deep cuts to nuclear weapons arsenals. I will argue that policies of deterrence are, at a certain stage in the reduction process, incompatible with efforts to build trust. Considering that many NWS pledged to reduce their nuclear arsenal significantly and reiterated time and again the key role of deterrence in their nuclear postures, a somewhat paradoxical situation comes to light. The trust perspective suggests that only one of those two statements can be held onto as nuclear reductions become deeper. If one follows the presented claim, rather old approaches to nuclear reductions featuring the element of deterrence are adverse to strategies advertising trust-building, which are often proposed in today’s debate around global zero.