Meat Glue, Body Scanners and Eco-design of Household Lamps? The Role of Legislative Vetoes in EU Policy-making

Since 2006, the European Commission has been granted the power to amend legislative acts and not simply implement them. In return, the European Parliament and Council of Ministers have a means to veto Commission actions under the so-called “regulatory procedure with scrutiny” and post-Lisbon “delegated acts”. Based on principles of political economy, we hypothesize that these formal means of oversight will be invoked very infrequently by Parliament and the Council. Using an original data set of legislative vetoes of administrative acts by both legislators from June 2006- April 2014, we show that levels of the formal exercise of the legislative veto to overrule the Commission’s regulatory policies are very low. Augmenting the collective oversight of Commission policy by the European legislative bodies, these legislative scrutiny provisions appear to be enhancing the negotiating position of individual legislators and legislative committees.