In formal models aiming to explain legislative organisation, the ‘legislative state of nature’ features prominently as the starting point of procedural reforms. This paper aims to empirically assess this state of nature and the conditions under which legislators depart from it. The comparative focus will be on reforms of plenary agenda control in four emerging West European democracies during the 1860–1918 period (Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany). The paper analyses the framing of the most important (non-)reforms of agenda control. It is argued that, firstly, the ‘legislative state of nature’ is not necessarily characterised by equal access of all legislators to plenary proceedings. Secondly, the successful centralisation of agenda control in favour of majorities is linked to two necessary conditions: on the one hand, an emphasis of reform proponents on majoritarianism, and, on the other hand, the confinement of opposition to (ideological or relational) anti-system parties.
