Utopophobia as an Ethical Commitment

The debate between proponents of ideal and non-ideal approaches to political philosophy has thus far been framed as a meta-level debate about normative theory. What, exactly, is the relationship between normative truths and facts about how the world really operates? The argument of this essay will be that the ideal/non-ideal debate can be helpfully reframed as a ground-level debate within normative theory. Specifically, it can be understood as a debate within the applied normative field of professional ethics, with the profession being examined that of political philosophy itself. As David Estlund admits in the closing pages of his influential article on “Utopophobia,” the value of a theory is a separate matter from its truth. True yet unrealistic political theories may be valuable, he suggests but does not argue, in the same way that pure mathematics is valuable. Even if this quasi-aesthetic value exists, however, defenders of realistic, non-ideal theory could reply that it would be an abdication of their vocational responsibilities as political theorists to abandon their duty to inform actual political practice in favor of a pursuit whose value resembles that of pure mathematics. This essay will defend a moderate form of utopohobia as an integral element of a proper professional ethic for political philosophers. By moderate utopophobia, I mean a willingness to construct unrealistic, ideal theories only when combined with an unwavering commitment to also conduct theorizing applicable to the problems faced by actually-existing societies. Indeed, the best ethical defense of a given line of ideal theorizing is typically how it can reasonably be expected to help inform or improve non-ideal theorizing, just as basic research in general is typically defended in terms of how it can reasonably be expected to inform applied research. The ethics of any profession can only be justified by the unique contribution that each profession makes to the greater social whole. There is undoubtedly a social need for reflection on how to improve our actual political life. Even if we grant that there is also value in useless truth, this does not grant a license to political philosophers to abandon the kind of practical thinking that others expect of us. When our students and fellow citizens demand that our field demonstrate its relevance and impact outside the academy, they are making a legitimate demand of the sort that can be addressed to practitioners of any specialized profession. This external demand, in turn, must shape the internal ethics of each profession so that it can best meet its unique social role.