Rhetoric and Deliberation

The concept of rhetoric has proved controversial for deliberative theory. It has been characterised as the irrational antithesis of deliberation. Yet others argue we should admit at least some forms of rhetoric or risk restricting deliberation to an elite version of reasoning unsuited to representing marginalised groups, whose speech cultures are less conventional. These exchanges risk blurring the dividing line between what is and what is not admissible rhetoric in a deliberative exchange. John Dryzek has recently attempted to address this deficit by proposing a systems test for rhetoric. Any speech that has the effect of promoting deliberation is acceptable. For example, emotive, insulting speech might still be legitimate if its effect were to provoke an otherwise apathetic minority into engaging deliberatively. I attempt to extend this approach by returning to the classical distinction between logic, rhetoric and dialectic. Logic refers to the soundness and validity of arguments. It can be determined by an appraiser of an argument alone. Rhetoric involves a speaker advancing an argument, which an audience judges. There is no interchange between them, and the standard of success or failure here is mere persuasion of the audience in question. Dialectic involves both a speaker advancing an argument, but also the role of antagonist, who is able to challenge and question that argument: a competition, in front of an audience, for the better argument. From this, I first argue that misleading rhetoric is not best combatted by banning it, but rather through strengthening deliberative processes and representation. Following Dryzek, the dangerous rhetoric is that which closes these processes down. I also argue the detection of misleading rhetoric can be improved by widening the opportunities for challenge, not just during an exchange, but also by developing methods for analysing the dynamics and characterising the outcomes of deliberative exchanges.