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Democracy as a Meta-Ideal

Democracy
Governance
Political Theory
Marta Wojciechowska
Kings College London
Marta Wojciechowska
Kings College London

Abstract

This paper calls for re-elaboration of the definition of democracy. In the current times of social tensions, many consider democracy as a rule which is unable to respond to modern challenges. These challenges include, but are not limited to, ideologically diverse societies, increasing inequality and mass migration. In this paper I argue that democracy can be a responsive and a robust system of governance. Yet, in order to become so, democracy ought to be defined as a meta-ideal focused on maximising popular control. I start by exposing lack of, or a limited agency of members of communities in question to decide on the rules of governing their societies in the current definitions of democracy. I show that political philosophy and political science, essentially, define democracy in a procedural or a substantive way. Here, I engage particularly with empirically-oriented deliberative approaches to democracy which, thanks to its normative foundations, ought to provide a wider scale of popular control. Yet, I demonstrate that procedural accounts of defining democracy, including many deliberative accounts, are paradoxically limiting popular control over the exact shape of democratic decision-making. Substantive approaches do not prescribe particular decision-making procedures and institutions to define democracy. Based on three chosen substance-based theories of democracy (Brettschneider; Christiano and Dworkin) I show that substantive approaches provides only a general framework for democratic governance which, in principle, leaves the wides scope for popular control. Yet, I show that there is a scope for opening the democratic control even further in order to include the sphere of values. As a result of this assessment, I call for defining democracy as a meta-ideal. Such open meta-ideal based on maximum popular control would not only define how the decision-making should work but also guide the formation of normative principles ruling the society. Democracy such defined enables for self-correction and continuous work on the options best for the society. I conclude that the only way this ideal can be implemented in real-life is by creating spaces for reflection on the rules governing the society.