Phenomenology, Methodology and Normative Theory

Continental philosophy has contributed methodologically to a range of disciplines within the social sciences. Nowhere is this perhaps clearer than how insights gained from Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology have come to influence Sociology (Harold Garfinkel), Anthropology (Clifford Geertz), and in Political Science (Charles Taylor). The idea of the hermeneutic circle is another example of continental philosophy’s methodological reach. There is, in short, a considerable disciplinary effect from continental philosophy on methodologies that can be found across a range of empirical research programs in the social sciences. In regard to political thought, however, it could be argued that the strongest methodological developments have been in Critical Theory, from Horkheimer to Habermas; and across the range of methods described as discourse analysis, which are largely hermeneutical. Without lessening the significant methodological offerings in Critical Theory or the strengths of discourse analysis, this paper seeks to go back to the methodology of hermeneutic phenomenology and ask: What is a hermeneutic phenomenology and what can be gained from such a methodology insofar as Political Theory and by extension, International Political Theory, are concerned? This question is an exercise of critique and of discovery. First, I question the merits of a what I term “methodological terminological inflation” in how the philosophy of phenomenology has become a form of shorthand for almost anything ethnographic. It is becoming common to find phenomenological methods being used across a range of disciplines, but the tendency is to treat phenomenology as a shorthand for the examination of how people experience something. This understanding is subtly but nevertheless significantly different from the term’s philosophical focus. Second, political thought is inherently normative, but it is unclear what types of normative arguments can be gained from a phenomenological perspective. The work of Emmanuel Levinas is significant in addressing this question; also relevant is Simon Critchley’s exploration of ethics in deconstruction. I want to revisit this question and ask whether or not it is possible to develop a methodological position that is both consistent with hermeneutic phenomenology, but can be applied to normative questions of a political character.