Coherentist Justification against the Methodological Priority Thesis

A popular view of science sees a clear division of labour between theory and experiment. Theorists theorize (usually with mathematics), and then other scientists craft experiments, collect specimens, observe phenomena, and scrutinize data. For a long time philosophers of science focused on high theory; the particulars of testing were something of an afterthought. That has changed: several philosophers have shown that the distinction between conceptual theorizing and experimental practice is often messy. Understanding the complex interplay between these activities gives us a richer understanding of how science – and scientists – actually work. I believe that a roughly similar dynamic has been at work of late in political thought. Philosophers and theorists are increasingly critical of what seemed for a time to be an obvious and fruitful division of labour: philosophers idealized about justice and legitimacy (just as game theorists studied idealized representations of incentives, strategies, and equilibria). Others then wrestled with how these ideals and idealizations might be brought to bear upon complex real-world dilemmas. While theorists argue over this methodological priority thesis, I suggest we ask whether or not their distinctions - realist vs idealizing vs nonideal - actually fit much of what they purport to organize? Just as the actual practice of much science is not easily or usefully separated into tidy categories of ‘theory’ and ‘testing’, so too with theorizing about ethics, justice, and legitimacy.