A set theoretical analysis of oversized coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper attempts to explain oversized coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Oversized coalitions can be understood as a controversial form of governments. Coalition theory in this tradition expects government formation by the smallest possible majority, the so called ‘minimum winning coalition’. While there is less attention to the puzzle why political parties in CEE seek to form oversized coalitions, this type of governments is not unusual in CEE. Empirical studies often lack a systematic comparative perspective or neglect different causal mechanisms. Theoretically oriented approaches, which look for office/policy seeking motivations or institutional settings cannot be transferred to the region automatically. The main reason for this is that coalition games in CEE are often shaped by “regime divides” between anti-communist parties and others. In this paper we show that multiple causal paths can be constructed by combined conditions relating to main hypothesis of coalition formation. The causal complexity is investigated by QCA in 8 CEE countries which observed oversized coalitions since 1990. We identify three distinct context based paths leading to oversized coalitions: 1) the office seeking path, 2) a combined office/policy seeking path, and 3) institutional setting path.