Political Feasibility is Political

Political theorists often appeal to the ought-implies-can principle (OICP) when they want to refute a political theory for prescribing actions that ‘cannot’ be performed. In this paper we argue that political theorists misunderstand the OICP. Considering political feasibility is useful. But the appeal to the OICP is misguided because it suggests that conceptual constrains are at work, while in reality appeals to feasibility considerations are typically politically motivated and therefore contingent. The most plausible interpretation of the OICP makes conceptual claims about ought-statements that can be addressed to a specific individual at a specific time. Put roughly, it is not true that a specific individual ought to do phi at time t when the agent is not able to perform phi at t. Many political theorists misapply the OICP in two ways. First, since political theory usually deals with institutions and groups, political theorists are usually not interested in feasibility constraints for individuals. What they care about is political feasibility, i.e. applied to groups. However, the OICP is not meant to apply to group agents or collections of individuals, especially if they are not clearly identified. Second, political theory usually thinks about change over long time horizons, often across generations. Facts about what is not possible at a fixed point in time are not normally a constraint on what can be achieved politically. However, the OICP requires a well-defined point in time to be applicable. In short, normative political theory is about changing societies and institutions for the better over time – a context in which the OICP simply does not apply. Even though they are not underpinned by the OICP, feasibility considerations still have a role to play in political theory. Different theories are built on different assumptions about what we ‘hold fixed’ -- that is, what we take as (un)feasible. Some theories take human psychology as it is but institutions as they might be. Other more utopian approaches do not hold human psychology fixed, but do feel constrained by other regularities. We maintain that different theoretical needs will require different feasibility constraints. However, for a political theory to be justified it has to provide reasons for the choice of feasibility constraints. These reasons can partly be normative and partly empirical. For instance, liberals may have good normative reasons not to make very demanding assumptions regarding human psychology. Sometimes the reasons are empirically grounded. For instance, it is often plausible to assume that cooperation in prisoners’ dilemmas cannot be taken for granted, or that humans are not perfectly rational. However, no matter whether the reasons are normative, empirical, or a mix of both, the many theoretical choices open to the theorist are at their core value-driven and political. Since this is so, clarity and transparency about the assumptions of political feasibility are essential for preserving intellectual honesty in political theory.