An Experiment on Social Norms and the Way to Power

Why is it that in the same societal-organizational context some abuse power for private gain while others do not? Within the bulk of corruption research this question remains relatively unanswered. Despite this limitation, early experimental studies on corruption in psychological research reveal the immense of importance of social norms (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2008; Köbis, Van Prooijen, Righetti, & Van Lange, 2015). The inclination to engage in corrupt behavior is crucially shaped by the perception of whether corrupt behavior is considered to be normal. Yet what does “being normal” actually mean? One main distinction between different forms of social norms exists across many disciplines (Bicchieri, 2006; Goffman, 1963; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). One type of norms (injunctive norms) indicates the acceptability of a specific behavior, i.e. whether a behavior is considered to be moral and/or legal; the second type of norms (descriptive norms) indicates the frequency of this behavior, i.e. whether a behavior is common. Descriptive norms are especially impactful and prevail in the situation of norms conflict (e.g. if a behavior is considered to be wrong but common place). This normative approach is an important step in departing from the common narrative that corruption is strictly a criminal problem. Such research is predominantly ‘bribery-centric’ producing crude generalizations about modes of exchange and often neglects power brokerage in organizational contexts. Our approach places entrusted power at the focal point by adopting a Public Goods Corruption Game that incorporates the role of descriptive norms. This experimental tool comprises of an n-player game in which participants contribute to a common pool resource and entrust a single co-participant with its distribution as “allocator.” Through interdisciplinary collaboration, our approach conjoins the experiences from social psychology and public policy research to examine the interplay between perceptions of social norms in their structural and organizational contexts. We ask how influence manifests in decision-making processes and how the “rules of the game” affect–or are affected by–normative behavior. Namely, using novel corruption game, we examine how the way in which power holder acquire power shapes the perception what is considered “normal” behavior. In an n-player game in which one player allocates common resources, we compare a setting, in which players determine the allocator by vote to a second setting in which a raffle determines the allocator. The overall research will shed light into the crucial aspects of how individuals’ normative perceptions manifest in organizational contexts. Our findings will not only be important contribution for psychological theory but will also serve as an empirical basis to improve anti-corruption intervention strategies (Rothstein, 2000).