Responsiveness in the EP — How MEPs Matter?

A large portion of the scientific literature considers that EP legislators do not matter so much when analyzing the consistency between domestic EU policies/rules and constituents’ preferences (Dehousse & Monceau, 2009). Nonetheless, this does not mean that MEPs always fail in influencing policies in more responsive terms (Navarro, 2009). Therefore, it seems pertinent to focus on MEPs as individuals and understand their behaviour, their strategies and their motives when dealing with responsiveness. Many studies have dealt with this individualized conception of responsiveness, and more particularly have focused on the determinants of legislative responsiveness. This presentation focuses on a different point of view. I will try to determine the effects within the EP of this search for responsiveness. In other words, How MEPs convert their search for responsiveness into concrete strategies within the EP? I will study two strategies. The first is consensus-building. MEPs hammer out compromises because it helps them gain benefits for their constituents and/or lobbies (regional funds for instance) or because it helps them signal seriousness. In this case, the compromise is a way to be more responsive. The second strategy is dissent. Consistent with S. Hix’ results showing that the EP is more and more conflictive, MEPs may choose to publicize a conflict with their fellows on behalf of their constituents’ preferences. In this strategy, conflict is a way for legislators to show to their constituents that they are caring for them. Focusing on responsiveness as mass-elite policy congruence, I will collect the roll-call votes of a sample of 50 MEPs on the highly-publicized Working Time Directive (2008) and try to assess whether those who are consistent with their constituents’ preferences choose compromise or dissent. I will show that the choice for compromise or for dissent as a responsiveness strategy mostly varies during the legislative process