Sustaining Honesty in Public Service: The Role of Selection

We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining honesty in the public sector. We argue that the selection of (dis)honest individuals into public service is an important channel for self-sustaining cross-national differences in corruption levels. Focusing on the world’s least corrupt country, Denmark, we conduct a survey containing a novel method for experimentally eliciting estimates of dishonesty at the individual level. The Danish case allows us to study students which in the future will be part of the elite in either the public and private sector. Results indicate clear positive self-selection into public service in terms of honesty. This differs sharply from existing findings from high-corruption settings. The findings are consistent with the interpretation that positive self-selection of honest individuals into public service is one channel through which Denmark is able to sustain its low levels of corruption. Differences in valuation of own income and public-private wage differences underpin the observed selection pattern. Dishonest individuals are more financially motivated and self-select out of public service and into higher-paying private sector jobs. We also present additional evidence on how the future bureaucratic elite of Denmark views fundamental aspects of society.