Heterarchical Political Orders and (in)Security Dynamics

In the post-2011 Arab states’ context, not only are state-society relations being constantly re-defined and re-shaped, but security dynamics seem to increasingly elude states and become decreasingly a salient feature of national sovereignty. This paper aims at shedding light on how the interaction between state and non-state security actors and among state security institutions is contributing to processes of state fracturing or re-structuring. In order to encapsulate the complexity of societal and political dynamics revolving around this issue, the framework of heterarchy is advanced. The focus shifts towards any actor exercising coercive power, beyond traditional expectations of state actors enjoying the monopoly of violence or its threat. Heterarchy has to do with the un-ranking or frequent changes in ranking among different elements within multiple, partially overlapping, partially competing, hierarchies. In Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Syria, state and non-state coercive actors have created heterarchical patterns of power relations, which cannot be subsumed under the framework of the Weberian state as the ideal-type analysts for so long have taken for granted. In all these cases, two conditions are met: the state struggles to stand above and control other power groups within society, and, second, the monopoly of violence does not rest in the hands of the state but is fragmented and diffused among competing coercive actors, having different agendas and varying modi operandi. Far from espousing a Weberian view of the state according to which most Arab polities could be categorized as either weak, fragile or failing, by referring in a comparative way to security agents and dynamics in countries in peace - Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt - and in wartime political orders - Syria and Libya -, this paper aims at enriching the debate over the long-term drivers accounting for the evolution and behavior of these (in)security actors.