Rethinking Authoritarianism in Conflict-prone Regions: The Malian “Incomplete Democracy” and the Role of International Actors

Since the arrival of the “third wave of democratization” Mali has been considered a promising democracy, becoming one of the international community’s ‘poster child’ on the African continent. When in 2002 a successful electoral process guaranteed a peaceful transition of power from the first democratically elected president Alpha Oumar Konaré to Amadou Toumani Touré, international hopes seemed to be definitely confirmed. Mali is geographically located at the heart of the today so-called Sahara-Sahel region. Comprising a territory going from Libya and Algeria to Nigeria, the Sahara-Sahel is seen as a region composed by supposedly fragile states, states where central government has partially lost the control on national borders and territories and where state authorities are not fully able to plan and implement essential public policies and services. After 9/11 state fragility and the presence of “ungoverned spaces” transformed the Sahara-Sahel in a potential vital threat for international and Western security. In this context, Mali started to be presented and rewarded, as a “force for democracy and stability”, especially by Western donors such as the US, the EU or France. Malian security forces were trained and equipped in order to fight against local jihadist groups, while Malian government was seen as the most reliable partner in the area. This situation contributed to hide the many weaknesses and problems, that characterized the Malian system of governance. On the one hand, the widespread corruption and the “policy of unanimity” introduced by the regime strongly undermined internal democracy. On the other hand, the informal cooptation of different transnational actors altered a fragile equilibrium, notably in the peripheral areas of the country. Those factors, along with the spillover effect of the Libyan civil war, brought the Malian state close to the collapse in 2012, while a low-intensity conflict is still underway even after the French intervention in 2013. Starting from these considerations, the main questions this paper aims to answer are: 1. How did Malian elites use international resources and legitimacy, when restructuring the local system of governance? 2. To what extent did the international action contribute to the involution of Malian democracy and to the collapse of the state? With the aim to go beyond the classical literature on state fragility and sovereignty, this paper explores a process of democratic involution and the stabilization of authoritarian practices in a low-institutionalized context, trying to assess the role and the impact of external actors. Considering local elites as the main agent we will analyze their incentives and strategies, in opting for the “soft authoritarian” option. Mali represents a significant case, useful to further problematize role and perception of international actors in unstable regions.