The Unintended Consequences of Parliamentary War Powers: A Comparative Analysis of Canada and Germany

Parliamentary influence on security policy has received increased attention in recent years. While a new strand of literature has shown that democracies are characterized by substantial variance in the formal-institutional legislative control and oversight of military deployments (parliamentary war powers), research also shows that security policy cannot be attributed to the forma-linstitutional position of parliament alone. This paper further argues that there is a need to question whether parliamentary war powers actually lead to the intended effects of increased legitimacy and deliberation. We compare the unintended consequences of parliamentary votes on the use of force in two ‘most-different cases’: Canada and Germany. Despite substantive differences in their institutions, political culture, and the formal position of parliament in foreign affairs, both countries held votes on their military operations in Afghanistan. Applying rationalist institutionalism, we argue that the observed type of parliamentary involvement led both countries to produce outcomes that undermine the original intent of parliamentary control. Rather than enhancing the legitimacy of a military mission and increasing deliberation on such matters, as assumed by proponents of parliamentary war powers, these parliamentary votes effectively diminished political questioning of the mission, thus reducing parliamentary scrutiny.