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The Kremlin Learns Again: Putin’s New Preventive Counter-Revolution

Comparative Politics
Contentious Politics
Democratisation
Protests
Stephen Hall
University College London
Stephen Hall
University College London

Abstract

In 2011-2012 protests rocked the foundations of the Kremlin in Moscow and in other Russian cities. At the same time events in the Middle East and North Africa saw the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the toppling of dictators. In winter 2013-2014 another event, closer to Moscow caused significant repercussions for the Kremlin. The fall of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine following three months of concerted protest on the Euromaidan shocked the Kremlin. Taking the literature on preventive counter-revolution and Robert Horvath’s book on Putin’s first preventive counter-revolution as a base this paper argues that there is a clear case of learning from these events, leading to a new preventive counter-revolution. The paper takes a learning approach centred on lesson-drawing and experiential theory. From there a brief look at the events of the 2011-2012 protests, Arab Spring and Euromaidan before engaging with the tactics devised by the Kremlin. Such strategies can be seen in the initial liberalisation to placate the protestors which undermined the non-systemic opposition’s role in the protests. But when Putin returned to the Presidency in March 2012 there was a significant hardening as the regime engaged in coercive tactics. In developing tough stratagems on the media, NGOs, enhancing control of the electoral and political systems, co-opting, restricting and infiltrating into opposition groups, building up fortress Russia, restrictive legislation like the Yarovaya law and the creation of new groups to aid the authorities. What can be seen is that the Kremlin has been on a learning spree since at least early 2011. The preventive counter-revolution has developed as three crises have developed that could affect the Kremlin’s hold on power. While most of this process has been focused domestically, there has been an external component with the authorities increasing Russian soft power to its neighbours as well as trying to influence politics further afield especially in Europe and America. This is Putin’s second preventive counter-revolution.