The Kantian Proviso

In his lectures, Kant endorses a proviso on the acquisition of external objects in the state of nature. This proviso imposes an obligation on us to limit our use of what nature has provided so that there will be enough for all (27:414). This paper sets out to achieve two tasks regarding this proviso: The first task is to determine the relevant standard against which one can determine whether an individual in the state of nature has satisfied the obligations imposed by the proviso. I argue that the relevant standard against which individuals are to be held in the state of nature is given by the community of common possession of the earth. The second task is to examine the implications of the proviso for claims Kant makes about welfare in the Doctrine of Right. I argue that the existence of a proviso is able to make sense of Kant’s claim that the state is permitted to coercively redistribute wealth. It is also able to make some sense of Kant’s puzzling claims about general injustice, which he characterises as a state of structural injustice in which some individuals are wronged without other individuals having wronged them.