Rawls and Kantian Cosmopolitanism: A Reconsideration of Katrin Flikschuh's "Kant and Modern Political Philosophy"

Katrin Flikschuh’s Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2000) provides an interesting presentation of cosmopolitanism with respect to Kant’s metaphysics and his theories of justice and politics. With respect to the relationship of property and social contract, it develops a concept of original possession in common linked to an a priori principle whereby the limitations created by the earth’s spherical surface and the claim of all men as rational beings to some location on this surface put them in interdependent and omnilateral relationships with each other that in turn become the foundation for cosmopolitan right. This not only becomes the basis of intelligible possession and public lawgiving within an individual state, but also the means for relating cosmopolitan right to the right of a state and the right of nations. On Flikschuh’s account, Kant’s social contract theory thus creates a continuing progress towards a condition of cosmopolitan right where the orientation is always towards future objectives that must be achieved on a global scale. Flikschuh concludes with an analysis of cosmopolitanism and economic agency which includes a critique of Rawls’s difference principle. Flikschuh’s account has been criticized by Alyssa R. Bernstein, who defends Rawls against what she sees as Flikschuh’s general misunderstandings of Rawls’s political philosophy that are spread throughout the book. However, Bernstein isolates these criticisms of Rawls from the larger context of Flikschuh’s thesis and thus fails to grasp the book’s portrayal of Kantian cosmopolitanism which does, it will be argued, open legitimate lines of attack against several Rawlsian themes, particularly those outlined in The Law of Peoples. Flikschuh’s portrayal strongly emphasizes the importance of the Rechtslehre over and above that of Toward Perpetual Peace in setting forth the metaphysical dimensions of Kant’s argument, with the latter being stressed, according to Flikschuh, by those giving greater importance to the empirical dimensions of Kant’s theory. Bernstein is also dismissive of Flikschuh’s critique of the difference principle, merely referencing an essay by Paul Guyer rather than addressing criticisms point by point. This essay will build upon both Flikschuh’s articulation of Kant’s cosmopolitanism and Bernstein’s defense of Rawls in order to construct a broader critique of Rawls’s Law of the Peoples. It will be argued that Thomas Piketty’s theories have clearly established the systemic and unsustainable nature of economic inequality, thereby undermining the viability of the difference principle. Rawls’s eighth principle of providing assistance to distressed peoples may have to be reconsidered and put on a more permanent basis in future, given the realities of climate change, resource depletion, etc. Rawls’s concept of primary goods does not fit well with Kant’s justification of the authority of the state based on the provision of basic entitlements, which points instead to the divisions between necessary goods and luxuries, use value vs exchange value that were important to Adam Smith and the early classical economists. These and several other arguments against Rawls (including those of Pogge) will be considered.