Getting Right Back to Where They Started From: De Facto States Quest for the Status Quo and Reintegration

De facto states are areas that have declared independence from a central government, but do not hold international recognition. The expectation is that de facto states will vie for statehood. If this is the case, why do we see examples of de facto states not vying for statehood? What made Northern Cyprus agree to a plan that would create a federated state with Cyprus? Why does Taiwan practice a policy of deliberate ambiguity, which aims to keep the status quo as long as possible? Why does South Ossetia wish to unify with Russia after they have declared independence from Georgia? This paper examines strategies of de facto states by asking the questions: Under what conditions do de facto states seek the status quo? Under what conditions do de facto states seek reintegration? The costs of maintaining independence or vying for statehood may not be worth it if the alternative is another conflict or further international isolation. In this paper, I use state capacity to develop a theory that explains de facto states’ strategy for sovereignty. State capacity roughly consists of military power, ability to collect revenue, and institutional quality. A state with low state capacity is in a precarious situation, which becomes more severe for de facto states, as they are unrecognized. In addition to providing the de facto state with legitimacy as a separate territory, high state capacity is useful to protect against possible conflict with the parent state in the future. I argue that mismatched state capacity between the de facto state and the parent state produce actions towards reintegration or statehood, depending on who the balance favors. If there are similar levels of state capacity, the expectation is that the de facto state will prefer the status quo.