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Rebel Governance in De Facto States (1945-2016)

Contentious Politics
Ethnic Conflict
Governance
Adrian Florea
University of Glasgow
Adrian Florea
University of Glasgow

Abstract

De facto states (e.g. Abkhazia; Northern Cyprus; Somaliland) are unrecognized separatist enclaves that display many characteristics of statehood (territorial control; coercive, extractive, and redistributive institutions) but lack an international legal status. To achieve domestic and external legitimacy, these actors engage in a wide range of governance practices: they set up separate military and police forces, separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches, separate hospitals, schools, banks, or social security networks. Besides bolstering their legitimacy with domestic and foreign audiences, an extensive governance apparatus yields various payoffs: it facilitates recruitment and resource mobilization, signals commitment to local rule, helps the hegemonic rebel faction eliminate internal competitors and institutionalize a violence monopoly, or contributes to the internationalization of the dispute. Yet, in spite of the obvious gains that can be accrued through the establishment of a complex governance architecture, de facto states exhibit great variation in the range of statelike institutions that they build: some, like People's Republic of Luhansk (Ukraine) put together a rudimentary apparatus of control, while others, like Transnistria (Moldova), manage to construct a complex system of separate rule. What explains, then, the variation in governance practices across these separatist enclaves? Using original data, this paper offers an empirical examination of several environmental and organizational factors that shape de facto state leaders' incentives to supply governance. The findings reveal that rebel actors in de facto states are less likely to provide governance when they receive external military assistance and when warfare is ongoing, but are more likely to do so when they are fragmented, are militarily stronger than the government, when peacekeepers are present, and when they rule over a large concentrated minority. The findings help us better understand how environmental conditions and the internal characteristics of insurgent movements shape the nature of rebel rule.