Constituent Power and Transnational Partisanship in the EU

In the on-going debate about constituent power in the EU, constituent power tends to be conceptualised in purely counterfactual terms — a theoretical device meant to provide guidance on questions of institutional design, rather than an actual agent of EU constitutional politics. Aiming to go beyond the counterfactual perspective, this paper examines the capacity of transnational European parties to act as agents of constituent power at the European level. Drawing on such cases as the constitutive role of the transnational network of Christian Democrats in the making of the Single European Act, the paper develops the concept of “networked constituent power” and defends it as an alternative model of constitution making at the EU level. The paper argues that networked constituent power, coordinated by transnational associations of partisans, can adequately reflect the “mixed” form of constituent power many theorists would like to see flourish, and considers the extent to which predominant political ideologies justify and support its exercise. The paper also establishes several desiderata that must be satisfied in order for this model of constituent power to be considered democratically legitimate: that parties that join forces in a transnational network enjoy sufficient levels of electoral support in their respective states; that party elites do not cut ties with their national parties when engaging at the transnational level; and that networked constituent power is exercised in a reasonably transparent fashion.