Explaining Divergent Outcomes of the Bargaining Process over Self-Determination: Accommodation or Conflict?

Violent disputes over self-determination are the most common conflicts in our world today, including conflicts between the government and groups such as the Chechens in Russia, Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, or the various ethnic groups in Myanmar. Interested in the core question about the overall effect of territorial self-governance in multi-ethnic societies on conflict propensity, this paper takes a step back and looks at the dynamic and strategic interaction between a government and a group in the bargaining process over self-determination. It attempts to explain the empirically observable bargaining outcomes – autonomy, de facto autonomy, secession, increased repression or no change in the status quo – and treats potential violent conflict as an integral part rather than an outcome of the bargaining process. It argues that three main factors determine the bargaining process for government’ and group’s strategy respectively: (1) the group’s motivation, (2) the costs of violent confrontation, and (3) the value of the concessions. Since governments carefully condition their choice of strategy on anticipated group reactions and vice versa, the formal model developed captures this strategic interaction. As an empirical illustration, the paper discusses the bargaining process between the Indonesian government and various groups demanding increased self-determination.