The UN Security Council is at the apex of the global security institutional architecture. Despite increasing recognition of climate security at a national level in a majority of countries and, indeed, by other security institutions, the Council is notable for having so far made a minimalist contribution to the global response to climate change. For over a decade there has been debate inside and outside the Council on the appropriate role for the Council to play, if any, in addressing the direct and indirect security consequences of climate change. The Council first debated climate security and energy in 2007, and in 2011, issued a presidential statement expressing concern at the possible adverse security effects of climate change. There has been a series of arria formula meetings on issues related to climate change and the Council has responded to crises, including in Darfur, and in relation to ebola, widely understood to have been exacerbated by climate change. This suggests that the Council may ineluctably address climate change, even if it does so by default. In 2017, the Council recognized in a substantive provision the adverse effects on regional security in the Lake Chat Basin of climate change and ecological changes including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors. This paper will outline what the Council has done so far, and examine the political blockages it has faced in assuming a more prominent role in this issue area. It will then consider current proposals, including that there be created an institutional home within the United Nations for climate security. The paper will conclude by considering potential catalysts for the Council to play a greater role in addressing climate security challenges.
