The Paradox of Public Bureaucracies: Discriminatory Bureaucrats in Non-Discriminatory Bureaucracies

Bureaucracies are expected to treat customers equally and are assumed to attract people with high Public Service Motivation (PSM). PSM is argued to have positive effects on individual and organizational performance. However, a growing body of literature points out that PSM might also entail darker sides that so far have not been empirically scrutinized in detail. This study demonstrates the fundamental paradox of modern bureaucracies: People with high PSM are especially vulnerable to engage in (pro-)social rule-breaking (SRB) behavior, which ultimately leads to discriminatory practices threatening the very foundation of the bureaucratic principle. We test our argument by conducting an original vignette-based experiment in three countries (Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands) with 1,239 observations in total. Our findings provide first behavioral evidence on the linear relationship between PSM and the likelihood of SRB. Furthermore, results reveal that the relation between PSM and SRB is moderated asymmetrically by client-based information affect cues: Negative affect cues have a larger negative effect than positive affect cues have a positive effect. This means that high-PSM people are not only more likely to engage in SRB, but that they also discriminate more sharply between clients they perceive to be more deserving than their low-PSM peers. Furthermore, we reveal that respondents abusing their discretion in this way were fully aware of the harming effect for the organization, while the benefit for the customer appeared to be a less significant motivation.