Explaining Variation in Institutional Structure of Regime Complexes: Comparing Climate Change, Forestry and Fisheries

This paper compares the institutional structure of three issue areas (climate change, forestry and fisheries) and explains variation in their structural features using three different theoretical models. Research on global environmental governance in the tradition of neo-liberal institutionalism has shifted its attention from individual institutions towards ‘regime complexes’, also known as ‘architectures’, ‘governance systems’ or ‘assemblages’. Emerging evidence suggests that several environmental issues (e.g. climate change, plant genetic resources and biodiversity) are governed by loosely coupled sets of institutions rather than single and coherent regimes. Discussions to date have been preoccupied with conceptualizations and ideal-type assessments of regime complexes and their properties, for example with the question whether regime complexes are institutionally fragmented or polycentric. What is missing are empirical mappings comparing different regime complexes and subsequent theory-based explanations for the observed variation in the characteristics of institutional structures across issue areas. Accordingly, this paper tries to answer the question: What explains variation in structure across different regime complexes for global environmental issues? The paper consists of two sections. First, it presents and discusses variation in the institutional structures of three environmental regime complexes governing climate change, forestry, and fisheries, building on data collected in the CONNECT-project (www.fragmentation.eu). The regime complexes are first visualized and compared using a ‘governance triangle’, a heuristic tool positioning institutions based on their constitutive members (public, firm, civil society or different combinations thereof) in a triangle consisting of seven zones. Then the regime complexes are compared using network analysis by connecting the institutions via shared membership. The results show large variance in terms of number of institutions, functions, and structure. They also suggest large variance in the structural distribution of public, private and hybrid institutions. Second, the paper tests three theoretical explanations for varying institutional structures. First, an explanation evolving around the idea of problem-structure, i.e. that specific properties of the governance challenge at hand (e.g. climate change) inform observed institutional structures set up to address the very same problem. It suggests a functional explanation, where the problem-structure (is the problem malign or benign?) generates a certain institutional structure. Second, a political economy explanation that assumes similar structural features (e.g. distribution of winners and losers) to inform the institutional structure. It suggests political drivers behind the various institutional structures. Third, an explanation that starts from institutional theory, suggesting that path-dependency is the main driver of an institutional structure. It holds that decisions taken at t0 have implications for decisions as t1 and that time is an essential factor for studying institutional structures.