Institutional Changes after Snowden in the US: Further Separation of Powers or Closer Inter-Branch Cooperation?

The Snowden affair revealed not only the scale of U.S. surveillance policies, but (once again) the challenges of the distribution of power among branches of government responsible for implementation, execution, and control of these policies. Using its direct and indirect competences, all three branches – the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary – were involved in the functioning of the U.S. surveillance system, often defining their role, and interpreting the law in a contrary way. It resulted in lack of effective control over the system, growing secrecy of surveillance policies, as well as blurring the responsibility for negative consequences of imposing government surveillance of American citizens. The aim of the paper is to analyze institutional changes in the U.S. political system in post-Snowden era in order to determine, whether the government surveillance policies are properly coordinated, or, maybe, conducted separately by distinct branches and agencies. It is important to acknowledge who determines today the main direction of U.S. government surveillance: the legislative, or the executive branch, and, what is the role of judiciary in controlling the legality of that surveillance? The paper shall mainly focus on legal and institutional analysis, with reference to functionalist and formalist theories of separation of powers. Such an approach may reveal the character of contemporary U.S. surveillance policies – secret functioning in rivalry, or transparent cooperation of the government.