Selecting the Selectorate: Systematic Disenfranchisement and Selective Voter Registration

Nowadays, multi-party elections are common practice in authoritarian regimes. Some skepticism towards these elections stems from the assumption that their purpose mainly serves the regime (Hermet, 1978; Morgenbesser, 2014). Despite this regime supporting function, elections open a window of opportunity for regime destabilization through electoral outcomes (Schedler, 2009, p. 338). In order to bypass the uncertainty of the electoral outcomes, authoritarian incumbents and ruling parties can chose from a diverse “menu of manipulation” (Schedler, 2002). However, the color revolutions have demonstrated that blatant electoral fraud is a risky business. More sophisticated forms of electoral manipulation include selective mobilization (Harvey, 2016), strategic implementation of electoral observation (Sjoberg, 2014), and control of the media (Merloe, 2015), creating an uneven playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2002). A further venue of managing the competitiveness is strategic tailoring of the selectorate through selective voter registration and systematic disenfranchisement. A considerable amount of literature has dealt with voter registration and disenfranchisement in democracies, especially focusing on the United States. Little is known about these mechanism in autocratic regimes. This paper aims to fill this gap in research by examining mechanisms and effects of selective voter registration and systematic disenfranchisement in Post-Soviet electoral autocracies. The measurement of systematic disenfranchisement and selective voter registration poses methodological problems. The very nature of electoral fraud and attempts of quantification do not align well and therefore require an exploratory approach using information from election observation missions and data on electoral integrity. References Harvey, C. J. (2016). Changes in the menu of manipulation: Electoral fraud, ballot stuffing, and voter pressure in the 2011 Russian election. Electoral Studies, 41, 105–117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.004 Hermet, G. (1978). Elections without choice. Place of publication not identified: Palgrave Macmillan. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2002). The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51–65. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026 Merloe, P. (2015). Election Monitoring Vs. Disinformation. Journal of Democracy, 26(3), 79–93. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0053 Morgenbesser, L. (2014). Elections in Hybrid Regimes: Conceptual Stretching Revived: Elections in Hybrid Regimes. Political Studies, 62(1), 21–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12020 Schedler, A. (2002). The Menu of Manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 36–50. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0031 Schedler, A. (2009). The new institutionalism in the study of authoritarian regimes. Totalitarismus Und Demokratie, 6(2). Sjoberg, F. M. (2014). Autocratic adaptation: The strategic use of transparency and the persistence of election fraud. Electoral Studies, 33, 233–245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.08.004