Directed Reflective Equilibrium: Thought Experiments and How to Use Them

Normative theory is riddled with imaginary and real-world examples, thought experiments and intuition pumps. The use of such “cases” in normative theorising has a long and illustrious history but has also been subject to criticisms. First, moral judgments can be misleading because we are prone to be influenced by framing. Second, cases often simplify and abstract from real world situations, leading to the worry that fantastical cases warp our sense of morality. However, there is still significant confusion about the different types of cases used, what they are used for, and how they are used well. These criticisms can only be assessed once we have a clearer picture of the multifarious roles that cases play in our methodology. We identify two essential functions of cases in normative theory. The representative function allows cases to model normative considerations that we want to explore in an environment where we can add and remove further variables and complications at will. The elicitation function uses intuitive responses for some argumentative purpose, perhaps as presumptive support for a philosophical claim or to explore the implications of different principles. Most theorists using the case-based methodology attempt to achieve reflective equilibrium. According to this method, the aim is to construct a theory that maximally coheres with considered moral judgments and general principles. The theorist works back and forth between these commitments, discarding previous beliefs if necessary, to reach reflective equilibrium. We offer a taxonomy of cases based on the distinction between the representation and elicitation functions and employ it to develop a new methodology, which we call Directed Reflective Equilibrium. Directed Reflective Equilibrium, like its predecessor, accepts that neither intuitions nor basic principles are immune to revision and that our commitments on various levels of philosophical enquiry should be brought into equilibrium. However, it also offers guidance about how different types of cases ought to be used to achieve this result and in doing so overcomes a key shortcoming of reflective equilibrium, namely that it lacks resources to tell us what changes ought to be made in the event of inconsistency between our intuitions or between intuitions and basic principles.