Looking for an Efficient Disciplinary and Anti-Corruption System: Controlling Internal Controls in the Brazilian Federal Executive

Internal controls are frequently seen as a principle of good governance and an important tool for preventing, detecting and punishing misconduct inside organisations. However, their impact on tackling corruption remains disputed. This paper focuses on efficiency indicators used by the Brazilian federal executive in monitoring disciplinary action to determine when a bureaucratic disciplinary system loses efficiency, and if so, why that is happening. By assessing the process through which the number of disciplinary procedures pending is decreased until only a small percentage of cases need to be resolved by 5,005 sanctions resulting in dismissals and loss of pension between 2003 and 2014, the paper shows what the official propaganda (focused merely on the increasing number of sanctions) does not show: it is taking longer to punish civil servants and it is not because there are more procedures being opened. Based on the deterrence theory principles, it will be argued that, apart from an unbiased system where only those who are fairly prosecuted and found guilty are sanctioned, celerity and the certainty of potential punishments are imperative characteristics of efficient hard controls (e.g., oversight and punishment). With this regards, it is possible to state that sanctions for corruption have a positive impact on the increase in time taken to open and conclude a procedure and also on reoffending rates. Internal issues, such as civil servants overloaded with vast numbers of disciplinary procedures associated with loopholes that allow the increasing use of court orders to interrupt or slow the process, can be advanced as possible explanations for the Brazilian case.