The international debate on militant democracy, which has been lively for several years, focuses on the „sharpest sword“, the party ban. In contrast, milder instruments of intervention have received far less attention. German governmental reporting practice deserves special attention in this context, because the domestic intelligence service (Verfassungsschutz) has been publishing its observations since 1961. Thereafter, reporting practice has been regulated more and more precisely by law. In comparison with European neighboring countries, this paper analyses the reporting practice and its effect on the objects of observation by discussing the following questions in a first outline: What legal and practical problems does the application of this instrument of militant democracy pose? Can its use, overall, be considered proportionate? What consequences does it have for the actors observed, and how do they react? Is political competition and public debate affected, and if so, to what extent? And: Does reporting practice make an effective contribution to the protection of democracy?
