Moving on to a ‘Real, True European Army’? Analysing Developments in European Defence Policy Beside and Beneath the European Union

BREXIT combined with Donald Trump’s repeated attempts at destabilizing the liberal world order (including sowing doubts on the US’s commitment to NATO article 5 on collective defense), has seemingly unleashed further developments like the 2016 Bratislava summit where the EU Member States agreed to develop a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) to improve crisis management structures (i.e. a military staff). In March 2017 the White Paper on the future of Europe was presented, in September 2017 the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defense (PESCO) envisioned in the Lisbon Treaty was activated, and in autumn 2018 Emanuel Macron called for the creation for a ‘real, true European army’ backed by Angela Merkel. Officially outside the EU (and NATO) France launched the European Intervention Initiative’ (E2I or EII) in spring 2018, promoting military cooperation among its p.t. 10 members. The outbursts from president Trump show that these developments, at least in the White House, are taken seriously. This paper will focus on European defense co-operation outside EU and NATO. Outside the frames of either the EU or NATO defense co-operation seem to flourish. The one scheme getting the most attention is the French ‘European Intervention Initiative’ which is created to strengthen the European capability to intervene, militarily, outside Europe and to give the United Kingdom as future non-Member State, as well as the ‘defense opt-outer’ Denmark a possibility to contribute to solving problems outside Europe. The countries participating are the ones whom French armed forces have been fighting in various operation outside Europe, a kind of alliance of the ‘able and willing’. At the sub-regional level, security and defense cooperation takes place without paying much attention to institutional membership. As an example, in Scandinavia the Nordic Defense Cooperation includes Denmark (NATO and EU member), Norway (NATO member), and Sweden and Finland (EU members), and in Central Europe one finds the Central European Defense Co-operation including Austria (EU member and neutral), the Czech Republic (EU and NATO member), Slovakia (EU and NATO member), Hungary (EU and NATO member), Slovenia (EU and NATO member) and Croatia (EU and NATO member). Which potentials do these kinds of co-operation have? Are they ‘just’ pragmatic solutions to practical problems or could they be interpreted as first, small steps towards further European co-operation or even integration, as one saw it with Justice and Home Affairs?