Why Do Economically Left-Wing Voters Vote for Radical Right Parties with Economically Right-Wing Positions? The Role of Misperceived Party Positions

Why do working class members who typically hold left-wing positions on economic policy vote for radical right parties with rather market liberal platforms? Recent research points to the rising salience of cultural issues (Arzheimer 2012, Lefkofridi et al. 2014, Kriesi et al. 2008, Ivarsflaten 2005, Oesch 2008, Oesch/Rennwald 2018, Oskarson/Demker 2015, Spies 2013) and the “blurred” economic policy stances of the radical right (Rovny 2012, Rovny/Polk 2019) to address this important puzzle. We add to this literature by studying the ramifications of blurring at the level of individual voters: Our contribution considers how (mis-)perceptions of economic policy positions of the radical right contribute to its success, particularly among economically left-wing voters. We argue that voters often misperceive where radical right parties stand on the economy and that these misperceptions are relevant for understanding public support of the radical right. In line with basic tenets of issue voting, we maintain, first, that—despite the dominance of cultural issues—perceived proximity on economy policy matters for vote choices: A perceived large distance on economic policy should scare voters off, even when proximity on cultural issues is high. Second, we argue that “projection” (Conover/Feldman 1982) takes place as well and is amplified by blurring: Affinity to the radical right causes individuals to place the party close to their own position. In sum, we expect a reciprocal causal relationship between perceived economic closeness and support of the radical right. These two mechanisms may explain sustained support for radical right parties from voters whose economic policy position are at odds with those of the party. We test these ideas in a study of support for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the context of the 2017 German federal election drawing on the Campaign Panel of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). The AfD in 2017 fits our scope conditions well: Upon close consideration, it ran on a neoliberal platform, yet it deliberately blurred this position. At the outset, we establish a number of observational patterns that accord with our argument. First, perceived positions of the AfD on taxation and welfare spending vary widely among its voters, more so than for any of the other relevant German parties. This variation reflects a strong tendency of AfD supporters to place the party close to their own position. In fact, AfD voters who strongly favor increased social spending over tax cuts believe the party does so as well. In multivariate models of vote choice, perceived economic proximity adds to predicting the AfD vote. This effect is, of course, much smaller than perceived proximity on immigration, but still substantially relevant. To clarify the causal relationship between AfD support and perceived economic proximity we then use cross-lagged-panel-models and obtain support for the expectation of reciprocal causality: AfD support in t affects perceived closeness in t+1 and perceived closeness in t affects AfD support in t+1. An important implication of these findings is that interventions that increase perceived economic policy distance between radical right parties and their voters might alienate supporters.