Developing and Exporting EU Quality Policies? The Case of Geographical Indications

Since the 1990s, EU agricultural policies have become increasingly interconnected with environmental and trade policies, particularly in the policy debate and to a certain extent also in policy outcomes. This was translated into a limited degree of environmental policy integration in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (see for example Feindt 2010 and Alons 2017), while for example the introduction of direct income payments allowed for the continuation of farm support in a less trade-distorting and thus WTO-compliant manner. In the context of considerations of environment, trade and consumer choice, specific quality policies were also established, among which regulations on organic products and geographical indications. This focus on quality combines a number of policy objectives ranging from more environmentally-friendly farming to rural development and economic opportunities for farmers, with the assumption with regard to consumer preferences and choice that consumers are willing to pay more for these quality products and that these products can thus be sold at a premium. While organic farming creates similar opportunities throughout the EU, interests in the registration and protection of geographical indications (e.g. Parma Ham, Feta cheese) are more dispersed, resulting in a large number of registrations in some member states (e.g. Italy, Spain, France, Greece) and a relatively small number in other member states (e.g. Netherlands, Denmark). Existing research on GIs describes and explains this variation partly on the basis of differences in existing product bases and domestic institutions facilitating registration processes (Huysmans and Swinnen 2019). What remains puzzling, however, is why the EU attaches so much importance to the protection of GIs in its FTA negotiations and agreements and how the list of GIs the EU demands protection for comes about. Considering that not all member states are equally interested in the matter and could fear concessions to negotiating partners on issues that are important to them in return for the protection of GIs, and considering that many products on the EU demand-list represent regional or intra-European trade interests at best, but are hardly traded globally, this EU positioning raises questions. Questions that the literature is only beginning to address, and often from a legal rather than a political science perspective, has not yet found satisfying answers for (Huysmans 2019). In this paper we investigate to what extent the variables used for explaining variation in domestic registration translate in actor-constellations with regard to GI’s in FTAs that can help account for both EU tenacity on the issue in FTA negotiations and the composition of the list of GIs for which they seek protection. A special focus will be on a heretofore neglected element, by investigating based on a survey and interviews to what extent different producer groups behind the GIs mobilized in this debate and through which pathways (member state, Commission, WP). This will help us verify whether producer-state collusion is significant in the policy process, and establish the relative importance of economic and cultural considerations as motives for protection.