Reflective Equilibrium: A Truth-Seeking Interpretation

Reflective equilibrium is an important, Kantian-inspired method of justification in ethics and political philosophy. As developed by John Rawls, reflective equilibrium consists in seeking consistency between our considered moral judgments in particular cases, and general moral principles, such as the principles of justice. Considered judgements are those ‘given under conditions in which our capacity for judgment is most likely to have been fully exercised and not affected by distorting influences’ (Rawls 2001, 29). Both, that is, the considered judgements and the general principles, are open to reformulation against each other, so that a coherent moral view is achieved. The requirement of coherence is therefore at the heart of the method. The question that remains, however – in the light of possible charges of bias, relativity, or inconclusiveness of reflective equilibrium – is the question of moral truth. Certainly, the said method can be interpreted in ways that are truth-neutral. It can be namely perceived as a mere description of our moral sense (purely descriptive interpretation), or as a construction that is expedient to have for purposes of political life, but which does not make claim to truth (the constructivist interpretation). I the proposed paper, I am going to present and defend a different – realist, or truth-seeking – interpretation of reflective equilibrium. In all the truth-neutral readings, the ultimate basis for reflective equilibrium cannot be found elsewhere but in our moral intuitions. In other words, the ‘input’ that we start with once engaging in moral reasoning comes ultimately from intuitions. I will claim that reflective equilibrium should be open for other sources of ‘input’, namely, about facts (that happen in the world). Moral intuitions being preserved as a legitimate ‘input’, facts and theories about the world – according to a wide reflective equilibrium view, developed by Daniels (1979) – should also be included. The proposed paper will deal with the problems that come with a realist interpretation, such as the problem of the naturalist fallacy, and will argue that, at the end of the day, the truth-seeking interpretation of reflective equilibrium is most plausible.