Not all inequalities are unfair : the case for equity as a criterion for the distribution of opportunities

The default assumptions in current political discourse are that an unequal distribution is unjust and that a more equal distribution would be more just. These assumptions are open to two criticisms. First they conflict with the moral intuitions of many people that it is unfairness rather than inequality in itself which makes distributions morally objectionable and that fairness consists in ‘getting what you deserve’. As Rawls has emphasized, a sound theory of justice should engage with moral intuitions (without being bound by them). Secondly they are a form of category mistake : they misidentify a description (an ‘is’) as a normative statement (an ‘ought’). The paper will consist of two parts, a theory part and an applied part. The theory part seeks to remedy the category mistake by first explaining that to state that a distribution is unequal is a descriptive rather than a normative claim. A distinction will then be made between inequities - inequalities which are morally arbitrary (i.e. without a moral justification) or morally objectionable – and inequalities which are morally justifiable or at least morally acceptable. The next step will be to indicate what can count as grounds for normative justification or objection. This section of the paper will give examples of values or valued outcomes including meeting basic human needs and individual autonomy. It will be explained in this section that equality considerations can have a role in normative reasoning which focuses on values and valued outcomes, but only in so far as they help to facilitate the realisation of the value or secure the valued outcome. Having basic needs met (valued outcome) can for example be the normative basis for objecting to distributive patterns incapable of securing this equally for all humans. In the second part, the theoretical clarifications of the first part will be applied to a case study. This part will examine how individual autonomy, a core value in modern liberal societies, is treated in transport policy and practice. In a liberal value system an individual choice of a life plan (or elements of it) is (pace J S Mill and Rawls) to be regarded as legitimate and deserving of respect unless it harms other individuals’ ability to live according to their life plans. It will be argued that choosing to live without personal access to a car meets this criterion but that this choice is not given the respect it is due. Instead transport policy makers and practitioners effectively regard those without personal access to a car as a kind of special needs section of the population which is “dependent” on public transport or on some special provision such as demand-responsive services. The paper will finish with an indication of how transport policy and practice could be changed in order to create more equitable opportunities for those choosing to live without personal access to a car.