Agent discretion meets pathological delegation: The role of the High Representative in the formation and operation of the informal groupings

The aim of the paper is to better understand a hitherto understudied aspect of differentiated cooperation in European Union’s foreign policy – the role of the 'EU element' in informal groupings, perceived as a form of differentiated cooperation. To this end, the paper conceptualises informal groups along the principal-agent approach as manifestations of pathological delegation, which occurs when individual states decide not to delegate a specific task to their agent (High Representative) but instead act through informal groupings. This is despite the fact that certain competences in this area have already been transferred to the supranational agent under the Lisbon Treaty provisions. An exploration of factors affecting agent’s discretion with regard to the Contact Group on Libya and the Normandy Group reveals whether and how the agent can contribute to the formation and operation of the informal groupings. The results bring new insights on determinants of agent’s discretion, which may be of interest to scholars investigating delegation patterns and agents’ performance in IOs.