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The paradoxical role of local councillors in Portugal: the political opposition in executive functions

Local Government
Political Parties
Party Systems
Filipe Teles
Universidade de Aveiro
Filipe Teles
Universidade de Aveiro

Abstract

Political opposition is a key element of any democracy. In fact, the democratic game offers an alternative and peaceful method of resolving social cleavages and conflicts, since it allows for the representation of a plurality of positions and interests, including minority ones, and establishes a principle of alternation of incumbents. The role of the opposition should not be limited to the election process, but rather to the continuing representation of these interests, as spokesperson for the aspirations of groups that are excluded from government solutions, integrating them into the political system. In addition, the opposition also performs an important role in control and overview of majorities’ activities. Challenging these very basic foundations of democratic theory, Portuguese municipalities are governed by an Executive Council that has the peculiarity of including opposition representatives. The municipalities are elected through party or independent lists and the first-named candidate on the list with the most votes will enter office as Mayor for the next four years (with a term limit of three mandates). This Mayor can delegate powers and responsibilities for specific areas of governance to other proportionally elected members of the Executive Council (including opposition representatives). On the other hand, with exclusively deliberative functions, the Municipal Assembly guarantees further electoral representation – through a different but simultaneous election process of party lists – that legitimizes its function of supervision, monitoring and voting of the main initiatives, regulations and governance instruments of the municipality. This design of the local executive body, which includes in "government" both "winners" and "opposition", fosters fragile governance arrangements in non-majority situations, and can menace the accountability capacity of the opposition. This paper will discuss and analyse the perceptions of local councillors in Portugal regarding their roles accordingly to their "position" in the executive council. It aims at discussing the effects of institutional governance design over the role performance of elected members.