Norms of Democracy, Staged Democrats, and Supply of Exclusionary Ideology

Radical-right politicians are common agents of backsliding. Existing literature sees attitudes as a crucial way of preventing their success and safeguarding democracy. But recent studies show that democratic support can coexist with lack of punishment for backsliding practices. To reconcile these findings, I argue that social norms generate incentives to declare that one opposes illiberal actors even if they do not---what I call staged democrats. This type of attitude is not a stable safeguard against illiberal politicians, because information shocks can reveal that citizens do not sincerely oppose their positions. Studying Switzerland, where referendums provide information on private citizens preferences, I collect data on referendum results, public opinion surveys, and party positions. I show that voters tend to hide support for radical-right positions. When referendums reveal that those positions are more popular than expected, radical-right parties become more exclusionary. Attitudes only prevent illiberal policy if they are sincerely held.