On the Conceptual Emptiness of Trumpism

In both academic and media debates, there is a conspicuous tendency to attribute a personal -ism to every second notable leader. Be it Bolsonarism or Macronism, Le Penism or Putinism, Merkelism or Orbanism—everywhere one can find such -isms, which, if they do not replace traditional ideological labels entirely, at least appear to be serious competitors to them. In this contribution, I develop a threefold argument for why these, at least in cases where they do not refer to a philosophical position (e.g., Kantianism) or an established historical concept (e.g., Stalinism) but to the thoughts and behavior of a contemporary practitioner of power, belong to a conceptually empty and deficient category of ascriptions that deserves more critical scrutiny. First, I argue that they are notoriously imprecise and may refer to ideological beliefs, stylistic idiosyncrasies, both, or neither. Secondly, I claim that they do not adequately account for changes over time and in the status of their namesake (who may think and speak differently as an incumbent than as an opposition politician), which can lead to the contradictory situation of treating as conceptually intrinsic something that is in fact ephemeral. And thirdly, I suggest that they often have an implicit pejorative connotation that makes them seem like a political pathology and conveys the impression that their supposed adherents are outside the bounds of respectable politics. Taking the popular but remarkably undertheorized notion of Trumpism as an example, and against the backdrop of existing reservations about the constant coining of new terms, I discuss these three strands of criticism and their implications in greater detail.