Truth and Politics in Kant and Kantian Theories

The significance of Kant's thought for modern and contemporary philosophy cannot be exaggerated. One crucial aspect of Kant's legacy is the idea that the critical approach to traditional metaphysics in all aspects of philosophy is compatible with a defence of objectivity, moral knowledge and universal judgement. Thus, two aims of (what we take to be) Kantian theories are those of avoiding metaphysical realism and escaping non-cognitivism; Kantian theories aim to deny that standards are already given, independently from us (and this is how its non-realist commitment can be understood)(1), while at the same time showing that such standards are not simply the result of arbitrary decisions, but track epistemic, moral or aesthetic validity (this being a common reading of its cognitivist commitment).(2) In recent years, there has been an increasing realisation that Kantian theories have the potential to respond to pressing needs in the context of the global challenges that we are faced with; many of these challenges - whether we are thinking of environmental crises, issues of political democratisation, questions of equality and fairness in the context of poverty and wealth disparity, as well as of various forms of unfair discrimination, the effects of migration and displacement or the search for peace and conflict resolution - need, in order to be formulated, acknowledged and tackled, some standards of scientific, ethical and political justification and judgement, which Kantian theories can at least hope to provide in their attempts to avoid both dogmatism and scepticism. This section is designed to include panels and papers from academics from various relevant disciplines, who critically acknowledge the significance of the Kantian legacy and mobilise its normative potential for the articulation and resolution of today's most pressing political issues. Panels and papers on meta-theoretical, normative and applied issues are welcome. Several panels have already been tentatively suggested (on 'Kantian theory in the age of fake news', 'Cosmopolitanism and migration', 'The nature of science and political understanding', '20th-century interpretations of Kant's political philosophy' and 'Kantian approaches to climate change) and panels on other relevant topics will be equally considered. Notes: (1) There are many ways in which norms may depend on us, but, for the purpose of this section proposal, there is no need to spell out the various ways in which theories can present this relation; the distinction between realism and non-realism is, we think, sufficient. (2) Sometimes Kant's position is called 'constructivist'. On some accounts, the more promising way in which constructivism can realise these aims is the constitutivist one. Hence, at least in metaethics, it has been claimed that ‘[c]onstructivism’s insight is that practical truths should be explained in terms of the constitutive features of practical reasoning, which the notion of “construction” is supposed to capture’. (Bagnoli 2017) Constitutive positions in epistemology, aesthetic and legal and political philosophy are also being developed currently (e.g., in epistemology, see Côté-Bouchard 2016 or Ripstein 2009). Bibliography: Carla Bagnoli, ‘Constructivism in Metaethics’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Winter 2017 Edition, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/constructivism-metaethics/. Charles Côté-Bouchard, 'Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?', in Philosophical Studies. 173, 2016: 3181–3198. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.