Methods in Normative Political Theory

Rationale and overview There is a great deal written about methods in political science, but relatively little about methods in political philosophy. This is surprising, given that so many of the ‘hot topics’ of recent years ‒ such as ideal/nonideal theory, moralism/realism, facts/principles, transcendental/comparative theory, and the notion of ‘political political theory’ ‒ all raise fundamental methodological questions. Put simply, questions such as how utopian or realistic our subject should be, how abstract or concrete its recommendations should be, or even how ‘political’ it should become, all raise questions about how we ‘do’ political philosophy and, indeed, even questions about how our subject should be defined. We propose to address these questions with a section of six Panels, all organised under the rubric of ‘Methods in Normative Political Theory’. These Panels follow up the highly successful panels in Prague in 2016. The Panels will be organised into three pairs, with each pair focused on one key question. First, how utopian or realistic should normative political theory be? Second, how abstract or concrete should its recommendations be? Third, what is the relationship between political philosophy and other subjects, such as history, political science, moral psychology, and so on? (Note that we use the terms ‘normative political theory’ and ‘political philosophy’ interchangeably in what follows, as is common in our field.) As there is now such a large body of scholars working on these questions, including a new generation of normative political theorists, we see a clear need for two Panels on each of these questions. This was made apparent to us by, in particular, the strength of the response to the Section we organised last year under the same Section title, as well as the size of the audiences attending each of our Panels. Four Panels have been allocated so far. They will cover the three themes: • Political Theory: Utopian or Realistic • Political Philosophy: Abstract or Concrete? • Philosophy and Other Disciplines Applicants should say which theme they think their proposal best fits, and Panels will be allocated according to number and quality of submissions. Panel themes might alter slightly after submissions have been received. Political Theory: Utopian or Realistic How utopian or realistic political philosophy should be – should grand theorizing itself bring in feasibility constraints or should such issues be considered at the application stage? The panels will reflect on the latest developments in ideal/nonideal theory, moralism/realism, and transcendental/comparative theory. Key questions include: Is realism a ‘method’ of normative political theory? Is it an alternative to ‘mainstream’ political philosophy, understood, perhaps, as Rawlsian theory or as ‘applied ethics’? What is the optimal division of labour between ideal and nonideal theory, do we have it, and if not why not? And what are the key distinctions, if indeed there are any, between the concerns of, respectively, ideal/nonideal theory, moralism/realism, and transcendental/comparative theory, given that they are so often thrown together in various books and articles? Political Philosophy: Abstract or Concrete? These panels will consider how abstract or concrete political philosophy should be. Political theory can be constructed at high levels of abstraction, such as Rawls’s guiding principles, or can be seen more concretely, with specific proposals for institutional design to reach the abstract ideals. Should, for example, political philosophers concentrate upon the sorts of property rights that are required to bring about fairness or equality? We can consider, too, debates that emerge from Jeremy Waldron’s recent book, Political Political Theory (OUP, 2016). Key questions include: Should political philosophers be dealing in abstract ideals or in concrete policy and institutional prescriptions? Should some of us be doing the former and some of us the latter? How much do our recommendations depend upon ‘facts’ about the world? How much should we worry about various notions of ‘feasibility’? What lessons can we draw when political philosophers do engage with ‘real politics’, either in history (Cicero, Locke, Mill, etc.) or in the recent past (William Galston, Onora O’Neill, Philip Pettit, Marc Stears, Jonathan Wolff). For example, Stears moved from a Chair in Political Theory at Oxford to become Ed Milliband’s chief speechwriter, before taking up his present role, as Chief Executive of the New Economics Foundation. What do journeys like this teach us about how, methodologically speaking, our subject should be done? Philosophy and Other Disciplines What is the proper relationship between political philosophy and various cognate subjects, such as history, political science, or moral psychology? The Panels will reflect on the latest scholarship on this topic, drawn from across normative political theory, both contemporary and historical. Key questions include: Can political philosophy learn from history, including the history of political thought, when it comes to justifying normative political principles? Can we rely upon our moral intuitions when it comes to justifying such principles, given the latest findings of moral psychology and, in particular, ‘experimental ethics’? How much can we use, or ignore, the findings of political science, in terms of what it reveals regarding the actual political preferences and behaviour of citizens? Does conceptual analysis simply clarify the language we use in our arguments, or does it somehow point us towards normative solutions and particular positions on, say, liberty, equality, justice, and legitimacy? How much do we need to know about economics in order to generate principles of, for example, social or distributive justice? And what is the relationship between moral and political philosophy? Is the latter an extension of the former, or something else altogether?